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introduction to the notion of civil 
society
Is there a need to reconceptualise civil society organisations (CSOs) given the fragmented, 
uneven, varied and sometimes contradictory responses of CSOs to the May 2008 violence? 
The typical catch-all definition of civil society is that it is the space between the state, 
the market and the family. It includes groups that came together to incite xenophobic impulses and 
act on them, groups that assisted their victims, and groups that take wider positions to challenge 
the structural conditions that fed the attacks. Asks Gordon White, ‘Surely a concept with this degree 
of elusiveness should be sent back to its coffin in the great church of political theory?’1 Michael 
Edwards agrees: ‘An idea that means everything probably signifies nothing… A glance through civil 
society literature would leave most people rapidly and thoroughly confused.’2 Are we justified in 
jettisoning ‘civil society’ as a defining concept, given that it is a container with such different kinds 
of organisations? Or instead, do we need more nuanced typologies to work through complex CSO 
divisions? 
While highlighting the socio-economic context in which 
people find themselves, we believe CSOs do indeed 
present an appropriate lens through which to 
view xenophobia, and to understand how to act against 
it. 
1 Gordon White (2004), ‘Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground in Civil Society in 
Democratization’, in P. Burnell and P. Calvert (eds), Frank Cass, London.
2 Michael Edwards (2009), Civil Society, Polity Press, Cambridge.
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But we must begin with the way civil society is treated in the most relevant social theory, and relate 
this theory to international trends and new civil society typologies, as well as to changes in urban and 
regional/continental political economy associated with structural adjustment and social grievances 
(1.2). Of special importance is the tension in analysis between CSOs that support the status quo, 
and those that oppose prevailing power relations, often on socio-economic grounds. That literature 
applied to South Africa permits us to raise critical questions about the nature of ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ 
society, and their impact on socio-political and economic challenges such as xenophobia. At that 
point we can more insightfully enter South African civil society, including the intense social protests 
in communities which are increasingly associated with attacks on immigrants (1.3). In Johannesburg, 
Cape Town and Durban, as well as some smaller cities that have witnessed ‘service delivery protests’, 
we find a conjuncture linking rising social anger about structural conditions to ongoing attacks on 
immigrants, especially in small-scale township shops and retail outlets. One reason, we conclude, is 
the failure of CSOs to adopt a broader vision of society, and of potential solutions that can be found 
in the sphere of collective action. Without strong analysis and an inspired vision, CSOs will continue 
to play the ambivalent role in relation to xenophobia that we have observed to date.
Social theory, international trends 
and the changing urban/regional 
context 
Social theory and political economy
Innovations in social theory encompassing civil society include an awareness of interrelationships 
and networks, and a growing sophistication in typologies of civil society. These are both important 
as we address whether a ‘networked society’ can cope with stress associated with amplified global 
capital and labour flows, especially in the acutely unequal Southern African region. 
Our premise is that civil society fits into various 
organisational forms that have high levels of 
networkability and flexibility, yet that face structural 
forces of both an inclusive and exclusive nature. 
On different occasions, in other words, civil society can be a force that turns grievances into progressive 
social change, or alternatively that generates reactionary politics. There are ideal-type theories of 
social organisation which can assist us in understanding how xenophobic collective action can rise, 
and likewise can be fought.
Within his notion of a ‘network society’, for example, Manuel Castells describes civil society 
organisations as a field of ‘decentralised concentration where a multiplicity of interconnected tasks 
take place in different sites’.3 Also seeking an ideal-type, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri insist that 
3 Cited in Helmut Anheier and Hagai Katz (2004), ‘Network Approaches to Global Civil Society,’ in Helmut Anheier, Marlies 
Glasius, Mary Kaldor (Eds), Global Civil Society 2004/05, London, Sage, pp.207-08. 
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their category ‘the multitude’ (as distinct from the ‘masses’) might ‘be conceived as a network: an 
open expansive network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally, a network that 
provides the means of encounter so that we can work and live in common’. Under optimal conditions, 
the network form provides ‘the model for an absolutely democratic organisation that corresponds 
to the dominant forms of economic and social production, and is also the most powerful weapon 
against the ruling power structure’.4
While there are certainly organisations and movements that work against dominant socio-economic 
systems, as described by Hardt and Negri, there are many more that work to strengthen existing 
relationships. This contradiction between the oppositional and status quo role of civil society 
is highlighted in the work of early 20th century theorists Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi. As 
reformulated by Michael Burawoy, civil society is either an active, countervailing force against 
excesses especially associated with economic oppression, as the Hungarian Polanyi argued in The 
Great Transformation (1944), or, in contrast, a sturdy bulwark supporting conventional wisdom and 
existing power relations, as the Italian political theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci insisted in 
his Prison Notebooks (1930s). Part of Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony depicted social organisations 
serving as state proxies that ultimately protect and extend the very property relations that are at the 
heart of social conflict. This dichotomous reading of civil society - as a stabilising, conservative force 
(Gramsci), or instead as a ‘new social movement’ challenge to market excesses (Polanyi) – returns 
in contemporary times, and assists us in working through South African and regional responses to 
xenophobia. 
Inserting a “supremist category”, David Sogge updates this dichotomous reading. He divides civil society 
organisations into three categories according to their normative values or ideology: “emancipatory”, 
or Polanyi’s challenge to market excesses, referred to later in this chapter as social change CSOs; 
“self regarding or inward looking”, or Gramsci’s status quo groups, referred to later in this chapter as 
“technical” CSOs; and supremist: 
An  Ð emancipatory camp. A diverse category populated by those pursuing aims consistent with 
covenants of social, economic, cultural and civil rights. Having been vigorously discouraged for 
decades by outside powers and their local clients, it is a minority, often a besieged minority.
The self-regarding or inward-looking. Ð  The bulk of voluntary associations and nonprofits may best 
be categorised as instrumental, as vehicles for service delivery, political self-advancement, etc., 
or merely inward-looking, as with the most religious and cultural associations, clubs providing 
services to members and so forth.
A supremacist category. Ð  Also in a minority, these groups routinely pursue domination over others, 
denying or subverting emancipatory aims, as agents of economic or violent crime, promoters of 
xenophobia, ethnic hatred, denial of rights to women and girls, etc. However, in some settings 
they can be well-positioned and enjoy the protection or outright support of those holding state 
and corporate power.5
4 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004), Multitude, New York, Penguin, pp.xii, xiii, 88,135.
5 David Sogge (2004), ‘Civil Domains in African Settings: Some Issues,’ Discussion paper prepared for the Hivos Africa 
Consultation, Arusha, 7 June. He draws chiefly on Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce (2001), Civil Society and Development - A 
Critical Exploration, London, Lynne Rienner. 
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Yet it is clear that there is constant movement, definition and redefinition, in the normative values 
of CSOs. Instead of fitting within any clear dichotomy, they shift and move along a continuum, as 
discussed in the following section. Tracking individual organisation’s movement, or more powerfully, 
CSO overall shifts along this continuum within national and local contexts, is critical to understanding 
their position and role engaging with challenges such as xenophobia. 
Indeed, the positioning and work of many CSOs together are contributing to the gradual development 
of a counter hegemonic ideology to engage in Gramsci’s “war of position”. During the 1930s, while 
in prison, Gramsci analysed the rise of fascism and the failure of liberatory political movements in 
Italy and other Western societies. He explained, capitalist hegemony depended upon not merely 
repression, but also consent via social institutions: 
When the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once 
revealed. The State was only the outer ditch, behind which there stood a 
powerful system of fortresses and earthworks… The massive structures 
of modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes 
of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were 
the ‘trenches’ and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of 
position…6
Burawoy interprets: ‘Civil society smothers any attempt to seize state power directly, so that 
revolutionary activity involves the slow, patient work of reorganising associations, trade unions, parties, 
schools, legal system, and so forth’ - i.e., Gramsci’s ‘war of position’, in contrast to a more insurrectionary 
‘war of movement’. Polanyi’s most powerful idea, meanwhile, was probably that of ‘a double 
movement’ in which ‘the extension of the market organisation in respect to genuine commodities 
was accompanied by its restriction’, as society periodically resisted excessive commodification, today 
increasingly invoking the idea of ‘rights’ as an antidote to market disempowerment.7 While there are 
all manner of problems with ‘rights discourses,’8 they do parallel the kinds of reactions to rampant 
market penetration now underway across the world, in the sphere of ‘reproduction’ of the broader 
social system, since civil society organisations are expected to stand in when neoliberal policies 
shrink the state. In such situations, according to Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, 
Reprivatisation of social reproduction involves at least four shifts that relate to the household, the 
state and social institutions, and finally the basic mechanisms of livelihood, particularly in poorer 
countries:
household and caring activities are increasingly provided through the market and are thus  Ð
exposed to the movement of money;
societies seem to become redefined as collections of individuals (or at best collections of families),  Ð
particularly when the state retreats from universal social protection;
6 Antonio Gramsci (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers, pp.238,243.
7 Karl Polanyi (1957), The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, Beacon, p.76.
8 For example, see Mark Tushnet (1984), ‘An Essay on Rights,’ Texas Law Review 62.
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accumulation patterns premised on connected control over wider areas of social life and thus the  Ð
provisions for social reproduction; and
survival and livelihood. For example, a large proportion of the world’s population has no effective  Ð
health insurance or even basic care.9 
The state remains the primary agency through which social welfare is delivered, through 
government’s command over significant fiscal resources, but because government control over 
policy is increasingly challenged by international financial and trade agencies, multinational 
corporations, and foreign donor governments, a great many social welfare functions have devolved 
to households and communities, with some NGOs reproducing the ideology of neoliberalism so as to 
maintain their own relevance. In reaction, especially since the 1980s, the world has witnessed social 
movements rising to contest public policy. Some do so in sectoral terms, on matters of housing, water, 
energy, healthcare, education and numerous other areas of reproduction. Others have emerged 
geographically, as Franz Schuurman reports, as ‘social organisations with a territorially-based identity, 
striving for emancipation via collective action.’10 
At this stage it is important to distinguish immediately between ‘organisations’ - particularly 
those that emerge in the implementation of formal social policies (such as welfare agencies or 
implementation-oriented NGOs) or in the reproduction of daily life (mutual aid groupings) - and 
movements. The latter are both protest-oriented and utopian, in the sense of attempting to construct 
the community of a future society in the decay of the old, in the manner posited in the classic studies 
by Castells and by Andre Gunder Frank and Maria Fuentes.11 But these tend toward the ideal types 
or the extremes, grounding the continuum that, as explained in more detail below, permits us to 
understand changes in position of civil society organisations as new financial, political, ideological 
and other pressures come to prevail.
international trends
From the 1980s, NGOs received growing attention as organizations with potential to salvage the 
‘Development Project’. Fowler12 lists sixteen advantages of NGOs including the perception that 
NGOs have strong relationships at the grassroots level, giving them greater legitimacy to engage in 
development.13 Proponents also argue that their small scale allows them to control costs and promote 
efficiency. As a result of their comparative advantages, the NGO sector boomed and there was a 
great increase in the number of NGOs as well as in their budgets and visibility. Hulme and Edwards 
9 Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill (2003), ‘Ontology, Method and Hypotheses,’ in I.Bakker and S.Gill (Eds), Power, Production 
and Social Reprodution, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p.36. 
10 Schuurman, F. (1989), ‘Urban Social Movements: Between Regressive Utopia and Socialist Panacea,’ in F. Schuurman and T. 
van Naerssen (Eds), Urban Social Movements in the Third World, London: Routledge, p.9.
11 Manuel Castells (1983), The City and the Grassroots, Berkeley, University of California Press; Frank, A.G. and M. Fuentes 
(1990), ‘Civil Democracy: Social Movements in Recent World History,’ in S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A.G. Frank and I. Wallerstein, 
Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-System, New York, Monthly Review.
12 Alan Fowler (1992), ‘Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market.’ Review of African Political 
Economy.
13 Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1995), Non-Governmental Organisations-Performance and Accountabilty- Beyond the 
Magic Bullet, Earthscan, London, p. 40.
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suggest that Southern NGOs followed in the footsteps of Northern NGOs, which nearly doubled in 
number from 1980 to 1993 and whose budgets had risen to $5.7 billion in current prices.14 It can be 
expected that this trajectory continued since.
Since the 1990s, analysts have increasingly argued, with more or less vigour, that the virtues of 
NGOs were exaggerated. These analyses served as an important corrective to the earlier literature. 
However they failed to acknowledge that some of the virtues of NGOs were eroded from the time 
they began to be trumpeted as a ‘magic bullet’. Analysts generally ignored how shifts in the political 
and economic environment have helped change the nature of NGOs, diminishing their comparative 
advantage. In short, these shifts to market dominance not only affected developing countries at the 
governmental policy level, but also affected civil society organisations. 
Over the past decades, developing countries have become highly dependent on aid due to worsening 
economic divisions between North and South and rapidly escalating levels of debt. In many cases, 
their precarious economic position essentially forced governments to adopt neoliberal economic 
policies advocated by international financial institutions (IFIs). Proponents of neoliberalism expect the 
opening up of the economies of developing countries to provide the answer to social ills, removing 
the need for the state to intervene in social welfare or development issues. Where development 
interventions are considered necessary, IFIs and donors have supported the strengthening of civil 
society organizations so that they can replace the state in the delivery of development services. This 
logic has even affected the approach of the more ‘alternative’ or progressive donors that have not 
consciously embraced it. As a result, civil society organisations, specifically development NGOs, have 
faced pressure to take on roles that previously belonged to the state and to adopt a more efficient 
approach consistent with the private sector.15 In the process, the nature of civil society has become 
increasingly technical, and this compels a more detailed categorisation of different typologies. 
Today, the significant diversity amongst civil society organisations, their roles, origins and variety of 
country contexts, and an increasing variety of hybrid organizations leads many authors to conclude 
that it is not possible to characterize the sector due to its diversity. 
Analytically this leaves us ill equipped to grapple 
with civil society, short of concluding that they are 
complex. 
We are either left to conclude that all CSOs operate in the same fashion or that each needs to be 
examined on its own. A classification of CSOs is necessary in order to analyze the impact of the sector 
systematically. 
Organizational classifications could be based on one of three dimensions: material base, 
organizational expression, or ideology and guiding values.16 Existing classifications tend to be based 
14 David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1997), NGOs, States and Donors, Macmillan Press, p.4.
15 Ibid.
16 Andrew Clayton (ed) (1996), NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies, INTRAC, Oxford, 
p.15. 
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on organizational expression. NGOs are classified according to their scope or size; whether their 
function is advocacy, development or relief; or whether they are run by their members or by a group 
of professionals. Other classifications are based on an organization’s material base: whether it is a 
northern or southern NGO, whether it depends on volunteers, or what type of funding it receives. 
While these are important differences, such classifications sometimes fail to differentiate between 
what role NGOs play and how well they play it. Differences of management, structure, or stage of 
organizational development are relevant to considering how well CSOs meet their aims. However 
they fail to address the role played by organizations. 
Classifications based on organizational approach come closest to addressing the role played by 
organizations. However, they tell us more about the development era in which they were formulated 
and the approach then seen as critical, than about organizations themselves. Their utility has been 
diminished by the fact that many organizations have adopted similar ‘best practice’ approaches. For 
example, references to participation are becoming meaningless as all CSOs claim to embrace such 
approaches.17 
The third dimension of ideology helps explain why some NGOs became technical organizations and 
others maintained a focus on social change. All organizations may have shifted in response to the 
global context and in response to donors, yet they have maintained important differences due to their 
ideological bases. The term ‘ideology’ is used in radically different ways depending on one’s academic 
orientation. Gramsci uses ideology to describe the terrain of the wider political struggle for hegemony. 
However his theoretical approach is applicable in the context of development. Development is, of 
course, a cornerstone of politics in the developing world. Put simply, the development ideology of 
modernization and neoliberalism is presently hegemonic, yet is challenged by the counter-ideology 
of alternative, grassroots development. One sign of the struggle for hegemony in the development 
realm is how proponents of this counter-ideology are infuriated by the World Bank’s absorption of 
NGOs into its work18 and its appropriation of concepts such as participation and social capital.19 The 
ideology of modernization and technicism, as characterized by James Scott20 in Seeing Like a State, 
has maintained its hegemony to such an extent that critics such as Arturo Escobar often equate 
development itself with this ideology, or treat the two as inseparable. This has been compounded by 
the fact that most of the development literature is program-oriented, treating ideology as a given 
rather than openly examining or even acknowledging it. Over the past decades this ideology has 
been adopted by proponents of neoliberalism, giving it a new source of power and, as discussed in 
the previous section, infusing most organizations to some degree.
A competing grassroots ideology of development has been developed and adopted by activists, 
a segment of the international NGO development community, and many local CSOs. It developed 
out of the ‘alternative development’ approach of the 1970s, which emphasizes participation and 
empowerment. 
17 David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1997), Op cit., p.10.
18 Carmen Malena (2000), “Beneficiaries, Mercenaries, Missionaries and Revolutionaries: ‘Unpacking’ NGO Involvement in 
World Bank-Financed Projects”, IDS Bulletin.
19 Ibid.
20 James Scott (1999), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale University 
Press, New Haven.
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More recently, development gurus like Robert Chambers have essentially advocated a new ideology 
of development that emphasizes participation as an end in itself and the significance of recipients 
driving the process.21 
In Democracy and Development in Latin America, 
Lehmann22 describes how this ideology, which he terms 
‘bassimo’ from the word ‘base’, interacts with the ideology of 
modernization.
Although it is not referred to directly, the development literature acknowledges ideology as a 
significant feature of organizations in two ways. First, literature has focused on organizational values 
and organizational culture, asking what makes CSOs distinctive and what they share with the private 
sector.23 Ideology is essentially the way that organizations express their values and culture through 
activities or practice. Second, the differences between Northern and Southern NGOs have been the 
focus of many analyses. However the geographical location of differences in values and cultures 
is misleading. As the geographical location of these characteristics has faded, we have essentially 
been left with two ideologies. The international development literature has produced classifications 
that include organisations whose nature is either ‘grassroots-social change’ or ‘technical-private 
sector’. CBOs can be accommodated in existing classifications as grassroots organisations. This has 
been captured in a powerful way recently by Sogge, who contrasts the ‘mainstream lineage’ with the 
Polanyian ‘alternative lineage’ of divergent civil society organisations:
Typologies of civil society - Sogge
 Mainstream lineage Alternative lineage
Membership of 
civil society
Local and intermediary NGOs, anti-
government media, nonprofit service 
bodies such as missions, charities, 
professional and business associations
Social movements, non-establishment 
political parties, trade unions, activist 
community-based organisations, 
knowledge-based NGOs, independent 
media
Main problems 
for civil society 
to tackle
Imperatives of markets, competition 
and modern life break natural social 
bonds. Tensions increase, threatening 
political instability. Lack of trustful 
relations in society sets limits to 
exchange and to security of private 
property – thus setting limits to 
economic growth. The state ‘crowds 
out’ private economic actors. Bad 
governance stems from oversised state 
apparatuses and from behaviour of 
government elites.
Domination by national and foreign 
state and private actors (often in 
collusion) generates socio-economic 
exclusion and insecurity. These set 
limits to equitable development and 
growth, weaken tax-based redis-
tributive measures, frustrate democratic 
politics and generate dangerous social 
polarisation. Bad governance is a 
cumulative outcome of national and 
global politico-economic and military 
forces.
21 Robert Chambers has produced an extraordinary body of work, which can be accessed through the Institute for 
Development Studies. One early example is Rural Development- Putting the Last First (1993).
22 David Lehmann (1990), Democracy and Development in Latin America, Temple University Press.
23 Jenny Pearce (2000), ‘Development, NGOs, and Civil Society: The Debate and its Future’ in Selected Essays from Development 
in Practice, Oxfam, Oxford.
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Wider roles of 
civil society
Civil society fosters bonds of trust, thus 
lowers business transaction costs and 
widens market relations. It compensates 
for loss of traditional social bonds, 
strengthening social consensus and 
consent to rules, thus helping prevent 
conflict. 
Civil society promotes the ethic and 
practice of solidarity and emancipation, 
animating and inspiring action toward 
state and toward private business 
interests. (Nonviolent) conflict seen as a 
necessary motor of social change.
Organisations’ 
positioning and 
tasks
Organisations together form a ‘third 
sector’ complementing the state and 
business sectors, though they are 
separate from the state in political 
terms. Via ‘advocacy and lobbying’ 
they hold the government to account. 
They promote decentralisation and 
reduction of central state powers. Via 
public-private ‘partnerships’ some 
NGOs provide social services, conflict 
mediation &c. as alternatives to state 
providers.
Organisations distinct from state 
and from business interests. Social 
movements may however crystallize 
into parties contesting for state 
power. Otherwise, primary tasks are 
to aggregate countervailing power 
through mobilising and forging 
alliances among groups of the poor and 
excluded via routine and non-routine 
political, judicial and media channels.
Level and scope Mainly local and national Local, national and international
Political 
premises
Approach is premised on notions of 
‘weak publics’ where opinions are 
formed but no active political leverage 
is pursued. 
Approach premised on notions of 
‘strong publics’ where opinions develop 
and political leverage actively pursued.
Contemporary
origins and 
backing
Approach associated with family of 
ideas centred on ‘community’, ‘social 
capital’ and ‘trust’ promoted chiefly 
by US academics and large research 
projects based at US universities. Major 
financial and intellectual backing since 
around 1990 from the World Bank & 
USAID.
Approach associated with activist 
movements of 1970s and 1980s 
confronting authoritarian, often 
western-backed regimes. Latin 
American, anti-colonial and some 
European intellectuals.
There appears to be a consensus in the literature, allowing for different terminology. The chart 
below outlines classifications of four other authors. Friedman, in reference to Villegas’ classification, 
distinguishes between popular organizations, politically progressive NGOs, professionally oriented 
NGOs, and parastatal NGOs.24 These relate well to the types of organizations referred to above. Similarly, 
Clark’s typology refers to Advocacy Groups and Networks, Grassroots Development Organizations, 
and Popular Development Agencies, which would all fall on the Grassroots Organizations-Social 
Change end of the continuum. His remaining organizations, public service contractors, technical 
innovation organizations and relief and welfare agencies, belong alongside the technical-private 
sector and state organizations end of the continuum.25 Korten’s typology is straightforward, 
ranging from people’s organizations to governmental NGOs.26 Yet the requirement that voluntary 
24 John Friedmann (1992), Empowerment: The politics of Alternative Development, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
25 John Clark (1991), Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations, Earthscan, London.
26 David Korten (1987), “Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development.” World Development, 
Supplement, p.145-159. 
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organizations depend on voluntarism pushes many different NGOs into the public service contractor 
type by default. Finally Smillie refers to stages through which organizations move back and forth. 27 
Ways of categorising civil society – Villegas, Clark, Korten, 
Smillie
Author Grassroots-Social Change Technical-Private sector or state
Villegas Popular organizations, politically progressive 
NGOs
Professionally oriented NGOs, parastatal 
NGOs.
Clark Advocacy groups and networks, grassroots 
development organizations, popular 
development agencies
Public service contractors, technical 
innovation organizations, and relief and 
welfare agencies
Korten People’s organizations, voluntary 
organizations
Public service contractors, governmental 
NGOs (GONGOs) 
Smillie Community based voluntarism, 
institutionalisation
Professionalisation, welfare state
What is the basis for classifying organisations as ‘grassroots-social change’ or ‘technical-private 
sector’? Classification depends largely on the attributes one deems to be important. Although 
the development literature treats ideology as a significant aspect of organizations, it has not been 
developed into an organizational classification. Yet an important basis of difference amongst 
civil society groups is often ideology, or the dominant values, norms, or orientation within an 
organization.28 In terms of ideology, the typical range of groups can be classified as social change or 
technical according to the following characteristics:
Ideologies as characteristics
Grassroots/ CBOs Social Change Technical outputs 
Based in the community People-centered or driven, 
bottom up 
Internal aim of democratic 
practice
Top down with participation
Internal Hierarchy
Community need as end End as social transformation
Empowerment 
Process as a means to achieve 
end, product as end
Delivery 
Relatively ad hoc Learning organization, shifting 
strategies
Blueprint
27 Ian Smillie (1995), The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire- Non Profit Organisation and International Development, Intermediate 
Technology Publications, London.
28 This refers to the ‘dominant’ ideology, recognising that there are ongoing power struggles within organizations over 
ideology, as discussed in the organizational theory literature. 
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Politics of survival Political, strong ideals 
(can include ‘radical’ causes that 
are not necessarily left wing)
Non-political
Local realities Local realities Linear, mainstream approach
Modernisation
In contrast, as grassroots organisations, CBOs are placed alongside social change NGOs. In general, 
they may appear to exhibit a mixture of the characteristics listed above: they are based entirely 
in the community, pursue a community need as an end, and are less conscious of organisational 
approach and structure. The overriding factor is often that, at some level, CBOs are simply about 
survival. In terms of their approaches, internal functioning, and the ends being pursued, CBOs differ 
from NGOs in that many CBOs are not driven by what many might recognise as an ideology per 
se, but by creating an immediate response to local realities. However survival itself can serve as an 
ideology, allowing these CBOs to ‘demand access to the resources it mobilizes in a manner that refutes 
orthodox developmental logic’ and to locate themselves as closer to social change NGOs or social 
movements.29
Since organisations often embody a mixture of characteristics, they can be placed along a continuum. 
Grassroots organisations/ CBOs as well as social change and technical NGOs are presented above 
as ideal types. It is highly unlikely that any organisation will fit one of these descriptions entirely. 
Organisations are constantly in flux, interacting with their environment and with other organisations. 
Thus they can be placed along a continuum according to what is given priority and to what degree, 
depending on their embodiment of these characteristics. It is also useful to place this continuum 
within its wider environment, including what is often referred to as the first (state) and second 
(private) sector.30
Social Change/ - - - - - - - - - - - Technical - - - -Private sector/
Grassroots organisations    State
Conceptualising organisations along a continuum allows for their movement in response to financial 
pressures, new formative experiences, and ideological shifts. Analyses of NGOs and CBOs often focus 
on how CBOs are becoming more like NGOs and NGOs are becoming more like consultants. They 
assess why NGOs have tended to move toward the technical end of the spectrum and some CBOs 
have also moved toward becoming more professionalised.31 However it is important to accept that 
all CSOs are in flux and that they move along this continuum as their characteristics shift. Movement 
in either direction can be monitored, as CSOs respond to government’s policies, funding pressures, 
and grassroots demands and needs. 
29 Patrick Bond (1999), Op cit., pp.38-39
30 Andrew Clayton, Op cit., p.20.
31 Organisations’ need to obtain funding explains much of their behaviour. Other pressures arise from being part of a wider 
network, when primary accountability can shift from local members to the network. Clearly there are competing demands 
that make the ideal of remaining accountable and attentive to the local level difficult to maintain. 
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CSOs’ motivation may differ depending on their location along the continuum. Technical CSOs may 
help extend the reach of the state’s service delivery, which Kotze refers to as the ‘efficiency argument’, 
and advocacy CSOs may ‘organise against the human fallout of neoliberal policies’.32 Kotze’s apparent 
third option is that communities have formed CBOs or community movements to help them survive 
in response to desperate economic circumstances and the neglect of the state, or to undertake local 
political action. This may also serve as the basis for involvement in social movements.
More generally, David Harvey argues,
Eschewing traditional forms of labour organization, such as unions, 
political parties, and even the pursuit of state power (now seen as 
hopelessly compromised), these oppositional movements looked to their 
own autonomous forms of social organization, even setting up their 
own unofficial territorial logics of power (as did the Zapatistas), oriented 
to improving their lot or defending themselves against a predatory 
capitalism. A burgeoning movement of non-governmental organizations 
(some of them sponsored by governments) sought to control these social 
movements and orient them towards particular channels, some of which 
were revolutionary but others of which were about accommodation to the 
neoliberal regime of power. But the result was a ferment of local, dispersed, 
and highly differentiated social movements battling either to confront or 
to hold off the neoliberal practices of imperialism orchestrated by finance 
capital and neoliberal states. 33
In sum, across the world it appears that some social and political aspects of neoliberalism are being 
transmitted from donor to NGO and from NGO to the grassroots level.34 There are no straightforward 
mechanisms that explain how this has occurred. Shifts in legitimacy, advances in technology as well 
as in control over resources have played a role in transmission. Perhaps the most straightforward 
mechanism, and one that is particularly relevant to the NGO sector, relates to control over resources. 
As NGOs have grown in number and size, so has their dependency on official funds.35 This creates all 
manner of problems, especially within and between these organisations, according to Alan Fowler: 
Troubling questions for many Non-Governmental Development 
Organisations (NGDOs), particularly in the South, relate to their place in 
society. Do they belong and will they be sustained within an eventually 
32 . Hermien Kotze, ‘Responding to the Growing Socio-Economic Crisis? A Review of Civil Society in South Africa’, Development 
Update, pp. 1-32.
33 . David Harvey (2008), p.189.
34 . NGOs’ ‘transmitting’ these aspects does not imply passing these aspects down unchanged since transmission also 
depends on the reception on the receiving side. Petras and Hearn discuss the potentially subversive role played by 
NGOs.
35 . David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1997) and Ian Smillie (1995), Op cit.
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unaided civic institutional ecology? And do other CSOs – either already 
around or emerging - offer more viable institutional forms allied to a 
development potential? Tentative indicators suggest that the answers to 
these two questions may, respectively, be no and yes…
It can be argued that aid has permitted, if not caused, a continued 
separation of NGDOs from the mainstream of civil society in the North and 
South. Despite concerns for sustainability, there has not been adequate 
investment in the social and economic rootedness of southern NGDOs. 
A topic for a futures debate is whether this situation is tenable and what 
does it say about the deep motives and commitments of donor countries? 
And, an agenda for action among northern NGDOs is, surely and at last, 
to be really serious about the long-term institutional sustainability of a 
strategically identified group of southern counterparts.
In sum, there is a prima facie case to suggest that social movements may 
offer better prospects for sustainability as well as legitimacy and the 
political influence required for structurally oriented development. And, if 
NGDOs could be displaced by associations of poor people as the source 
and driver of their own structural advance, empowerment in its deeper 
sense requires more (donor) attention to other civic actors and formations.
But such attention cannot be without very serious rethinking of 
mechanisms and processes for engagement that do not undermine the 
dynamic and fluid essence of movement life. As one leader remarked when 
asked if his movement could become more ‘organised’ to make it fundable: 
‘you cannot put a fire in a box’. 36
Since the environment or social context provides part 
of the explanation for behaviour, how the context 
affects organizations becomes the interesting 
question. 
36 Alan Fowler (2005), ‘Aid Architecture: Reflections on NGDO Futures and the Emergence of Counter Terrorism,’ Intrac 
Occasional Paper 45, Oxford, January. 
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Resource dependence is the primary theory explaining how this is achieved and, more recently, it 
has been developed further in the concept of ‘funding chains’.37 Resource dependency theory, as 
developed by Pfeffer and Salanick, is based on the idea that ‘organizations transact with others for 
necessary resources, and control over resources provides others with power over the organization’.38 
Funding chains show how funds flow from the original donor through one or more intermediary 
organizations before reaching the final beneficiary. Each actor is able to control the behaviour of 
the others due to its control over resources.39 Resource dependency theory helps explain why donor 
attempts to professionalize and standardize NGOs have been successful and why NGOs have been 
diverted into becoming implementers of donor policies.40
However it is incorrect to suggest that NGOs have no agency. Although NGO leaders often resort 
to blaming donors for the weaknesses and problems in the voluntary sector, donors are not simply 
external actors who impose their ideology on NGOs. It is likely that the approach of NGOs shifted 
to some degree independently of donor influence. NGOs adjusted to the neoliberal global context 
and, in many cases, to their new role in newly democratized societies. Typically an NGO establishes 
relationships and obtains funding from donors with whom it identifies a ‘fit’ in approach, ideology 
and practice and its work with the donor becomes a mutually reinforcing effect.
One of the key questions in the development literature is whether NGOs are changing so much 
that they are losing their comparative advantage or distinctiveness. NGOs that served as progressive 
forces for social change have faced pressure to engage with or represent neoliberal approaches 
of donors and states. As a result, we are witnessing a general trend in which there is a blurring of 
lines between NGOs and private sector organizations. Recent analyses of the NGO sector describe 
NGOs as losing ‘autonomy, initiative and flexibility that NGO status confers upon them’, losing their 
role as ‘radical social critics’ because they have been absorbed into the aid industry, and become 
subordinate in terms of ideology and financial dependency.41 James Petras goes further to describe 
NGOs as ‘agents of imperialism’.
To assess the exact nature and degree of change within the NGO sector, we must examine NGOs 
within a country’s ‘associational culture and context’.42 South Africa is a particularly interesting country 
in which to observe the impact of a changing global environment on the nature of development 
NGOs. 
37 Kees Biekart (1999), The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in Central 
America, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam; Alan Fowler (1997), Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness 
of Non- Governmental Organisations in International Development , Earthscan, London; David Sogge (1996), ed. Compassion 
and Calculation: The Business of Private Foreign Aid,. Pluto Press, Chicago; and Mary Galvin (2000), “We Have Nothing to Lose 
But Our Chains.” OD Debate.
38 J. Pfeffer and G.R Salanick (1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, Harper and Row, 
p.147.
39 In South Africa, funding chains can include international donors, international NGOs, South African intermediary NGOs, 
small NGOs, CBOs, and communities. 
40 Ian Smillie (1995), Op cit. 
41 Jaime Joseph (2000), “NGOs: Fragmented Dreams.” Development in Practice, p.390.
42 David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1997), Op cit., p.4. 
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Instead of being spread over nearly thirty years, as in other 
developing countries, the South African context 
has moved from state-driven development to 
neoliberalism in less than ten years.43 
Before addressing South Africa, we must look at specific urban processes in the context of structural 
adjustment that generate both inclusive and exclusionary social processes, and the regional lessons 
we can draw from post-independence civil society’s confrontations.
changing urban context
Since the 1980s, as globalisation amplified local uneven development, rising inter-urban competition 
between many of the world’s megacities reduced municipal management to the enhancement of 
competitive advantage, via the heightened efficiency of the city as an export platform. The bottom 
line was the productivity of urban capital, as it flowed through urban land markets (now enhanced by 
titles and registration), housing finance systems (featuring mainly private sector delivery and a dramatic 
reduction in state subsidies), the much-celebrated (but often extremely exploitative) informal economy, 
and (often newly-commercialised) urban services such as transport, sewage, water, electricity and even 
primary health care services (via intensified cost-recovery). To a great extent, the cities have attracted 
migrants from rural areas as well as other countries, and this lowers the overall wage rates as well, at a 
time of increasing labour informality.
Following the Polanyian double-movement, such processes have been vigorously contested by 
popular movements, agitating around conjunctural social policy decisions associated with structural 
adjustment, especially cutbacks in subsidies for food, transport or other services. As a result of looking 
to more structural determinants of the problems instead of just short-term causes of crisis, some such 
movements began to transcend the traditional dichotomy of urban organisations: between an inward-
looking territorial identity, and the rhetoric of a broader emancipation. As James Petras and Morris 
Morley explain based on Latin American evidence, they seek new alliances that traverse traditional 
spheres of workplace and community:
The power of these new social movements comes from the fact that they 
draw on the vast heterogeneous labour force that populates the main 
thoroughfares and the alleyways; the marketplaces and street corners; 
the interstices of the economy and the nerve centres of production; the 
exchange and finance centres; the university plazas, railway stations and 
the wharves - all are brought together in complex localised structures 
which feed into tumultuous homogenising national movements.44
43 For one of the best ten year reviews, see Daniel, Southall, and Lutchman (eds) 2005, State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-
2005, HSRC Press.
44 J. Petras and M.Morley (1990), US Hegemony Under Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin America, London, Verso, 
p.53.
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In the best cases, the unity of the urban poor and the formal working-class generate the kinds of fused 
social movements, trade unions and political parties that have come to power in Latin America. The 
reason for this fusion is the commonality of problems that people suffer especially during economic 
crisis, Petras and Morley continue: ‘The great flows of capital disintegrate the immobile isolated 
household units, driving millions into the vortex of production and circulation of commodities; this 
moment of wrenching dislocation and relocation is silently, individually experienced by the mass 
of people, who struggle to find their place, disciplined by the struggle for basic needs and by the 
absolute reign of ascending capital.’45 Under such conditions, which also apply in South African 
townships, the social base for urban movements is continually regenerated, and people often find a 
wider identity in a collective.
Much social theory identifies such collectives as potentially liberatory, and in South Africa during 
the 1980s and early 1990s in the fight against apartheid, the collectivization of black resistance – 
especially the fusing of middle-class, workers and poor people – had the beneficial impact of creating 
a layer of organic intellectuals which provided strong leadership and commitment, directed against 
official racism. Petras and Morley note that the major urban social movements of the past quarter 
century, in South Africa and many other middle-income countries,
emerged to break the bonds of authoritarian politics and the constraints 
of police state regimes, to overcome the passivity and paralysis of the 
traditional opposition, and to forge a new political reality. What makes 
these social movements different from those in the past is that they are 
independent of traditional party-electoral political machines. They are 
led and directed by grassroots leaders. Policy is constantly debated in 
democratic popular assemblies. The strong ties to local communities and 
the intense but profoundly democratic political life has enabled these 
new social movements to mobilize previously unorganised strata: the 
unemployed, young women, squatters, indigenous peoples. 
The new social movements combine with and transcend the action of 
organised labour movements; street action surges beyond the wage issues 
toward enlarging the areas of freedom for people to act and realise their 
human dignity.46
However, economic crisis can also generate potentially fascist and xenophobic impulses, and the 
South African case provides evidence of both. It is not always feasible to specify the construction of 
social movement identity in urban settings, where conjunctural features are legion but where overt 
market processes have torn asunder land relations, rural ties, indigenous culture, and many forms of 
pre-existing authority and social control. The identity of social movements can be traced, at least to 
45 J. Petras and M. Morley (1990), Op cit.
46 J. Petras and M. Morley (1990), Op cit.
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some extent, through their implicit or explicit strategic orientations. From experiences with urban 
movements in Santiago, Eugenio Tironi conceptualise two fields of strategic polarization: between 
a sense of exploitation or exclusion, and between the goals of participation within or breaking 
from the wider political, economic and cultural system. Four categories - and prototypical modes of 
political organisation - result across this matrix of characteristics.47
Identities of Social Movement Constituents
status, objectives excluded exploited
participation 1 populists/ social change NGOs 
and CBOs
2 trade unionists
revolution 4 alternative/ autonomists 3 revolutionaries/ socialists
First, those who feel excluded and are anxious to participate more are often supporters of traditional 
populism (pobladores), who are logically the most prone to xenophobic collective action. Second, 
those who felt both exploited and anxious to participate more in the system included traditional 
trade unionists. Third, those who feel exploited by the system and who are interested in its formal 
rupture include traditional revolutionaries. Fourth, there are those alienated social forces which are 
excluded from the system and which also desire its rupture - and which are also, in many cases, 
engaged in collective subsistence activities that aim towards the construction of an alternative life-
style based, at least to some extent, on the economy of solidarity.
The point, here, is that a variety of structural factors are putting extreme stress on society, and civil 
society organisations are only coping in uneven, partial ways, and with different strategic orientations. 
The contribution of social theory is partly to establish how these organisations have come to play 
a role in not only community but even household reproduction, and how the changing structural 
context generates new functions for urban organisations. To get to the roots of the xenophobia 
problem requires us to grapple with these theoretical problems and comparative experiences. 
Indeed, a great deal can be learned by considering how civil society groupings have emerged over 
time in this region and continent.
civil society in Southern africa and africa
The Southern African region has been amongst the world’s leading examples of super-exploitative 
social relations, networked through migrant labour and settler colonial power. The result is a legacy of 
social dysfunction, from searing, gendered violence to deep and degrading poverty standing shoulder 
to shoulder with high modern luxury lifestyles. These were partially homegrown phenomena, insofar 
as white settlers accumulated and reinvested capital and established violent means of maintaining 
state power. They were also partially linked to blatant forms of foreign economic exploitation. Settler 
control occurred through coercive mechanisms that forced Africans into mines, fields and factory 
47 Authors have inserted additional labels within the 2x2 presented by Franz Schuurman (1990), ‘Modernity, Post-Modernity 
and the New Social Movements,’ in F.Schuurman (ed), Beyond the Impasse, London, Zed Books, pp.200-201. See also, in 
Spanish, E. Tironi (1987), ‘Pobladores e Integracion Social,’ Proposiciones 14.
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compounds. The system of migrant labour underpinned apartheid and its variations. In the process, 
women had the added burden of subsidising capitalism through their own survival systems. Since 
schools, medical schemes and pensions for urban workers were largely nonexistent, such standard 
input costs associated with employment and social reproduction were borne mainly by those left 
behind in the rural areas, not by the state or by firms. This nexus of racism, patriarchy and capitalism 
was an ingenious way to produce and reproduce cheap black labour. 
This is not merely of historical interest, for tragically, the central aspects of migrant labour remain 
important to this day in many of Southern Africa’s extractive-oriented economies, including South 
Africa. They help explain the vast spread of urban slums and temporary residential accommodation 
in the most miserable circumstances that, as another chapter describes, were central to the 
xenophobia of 2008 and to simmering resentments before and after. But the most important 
complication, according to Burawoy, is that the region’s civil society retains a variety of pre-market 
social relationships, in part through longstanding resistance to settler colonialism:
The colonial order not only failed to destroy indigenous society, it made 
active attempts to uphold such a society. The colonisers themselves set 
limits on the intrusion of the market into African communities. Colonial 
rule sought to protect indigenous communities as reservoirs of cheap 
labour on the one side and for reasons of political stability on the other. 
Squeezed into smaller land areas, disadvantaged in their competition with 
white farmers (who received all sorts of price subsidies and monopolies), 
and above all subject to taxation, Africans were compelled to seek 
employment in the towns. Once they arrived on the mines (or other 
employer), however, they sold their labour power as single workers with 
limited residence rights in the urban areas. Wage rates were set below 
subsistence, which ensured cheap labour for capital but also compelled 
the urban worker to retain ties to the rural community where his family 
eked out a separate subsistence existence. The longevity of colonial 
systems of segregation and indirect rule depended on the vitality of an 
indigenous society to prevent the urban concentration of workers who 
might have posed (and eventually did) a political threat to apartheid.48
In opposition to these fragmenting processes, the region’s interrelated civil society and political 
traditions grew and intermingled. They included vibrant nationalist liberation insurgencies, political 
parties that claimed one or another variant of socialism, mass movements (sometimes peasant-based, 
sometimes emerging from degraded urban ghettoes), and powerful unions. Religious protesters, 
women’s groups, students and youth played catalytic roles that changed history in given locales. The 
region’s and continent’s nationalist movements forged panAfricanism in productive alliances with 
48 Michael Burawoy (2003), ‘For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl 
Polanyi,’ Politics and Society, 31, 2, pp.222-223.
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diasporic intellectuals and in the process, established newly empowered relations with northern 
critics of colonialism, apartheid and racism. 
But from that context, lasting through the early 1990s in South Africa, when civil society opposition 
to apartheid peaked, two processes unfolded. First, the organisations which once had a more 
radical developmental agenda were subsequently either repressed or co-opted and channelled 
into serving each new incarnation of elite interest. In some African countries, the reaction to the 
excesses of exhausted, corrupt and repressive nationalist political parties included a new generation 
of democratic movements, human rights advocates, NGOs, churches, youth and women’s groups, 
and a variety of other civil society groups across the region.
But second, the rise of structural adjustment compelled some in civil society to become active in 
socio-economic advocacy. The apparent explosion of mutual aid systems, Claude Ake reminds, ‘is 
first and foremost a child of necessity, of desperation even.’49 Structural adjustment meant the loss 
of state welfare programmes, and in turn the need for civil societies to pick up the pieces. When 
amidst the wreckage, alternative political parties emerged from the grassroots and shopfloors (most 
spectacularly in Zambia, perhaps), the balance of power meant that they too often fell into the trap 
of deepening the market’s rule, at the expense of popular interests. Meanwhile, the inherited duality 
of power continued: between a centrally-located modern state (sometimes directly responsible for 
urban order in primate capital cities) and, according to Mahmood Mamdani, a ‘tribal authority which 
dispensed customary law to those living within the territory of the tribe’. This understanding helps 
us contextualise the struggles for human rights, democratisation and socio-economic justice, as 
Mamdani links the global-national-local scales:
In the absence of democratisation, development became a top-
down agenda enforced on the peasantry. Without thorough-going 
democratisation, there could be no development of a home market. The 
latter failure opened wide what was a crevice at Independence. With 
every downturn in the international economy, the crevice turned into an 
opportunity for an externally defined structural adjustment that combined 
a narrowly defined programme of privatisation with a broadly defined 
programme of globalisation. 50
Across the region, the ‘Washington Consensus’ macroeconomic policies, debt peonage and unfair 
terms of trade intensified the adverse power of neocolonialism. In addition, the micro-developmental 
and ecological damage done through market-centred policies is now also widely recognised. Where 
civil society rose to contest these problems, according to Demba Dembele, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions reacted with a dangerous ideology: 
49 Claude Ake (2000), The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar, Codesria, p.47.
50 Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, pp.111and 287.
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They create the illusion of ‘poverty reduction’ while pursuing the same 
failed and discredited policies, with even more conditionalities; promote 
a superficial ‘national consensus’ on short-term ‘poverty reduction’ 
programmes at the expense of a serious and deep reflection on long-term 
development policies; drive a wedge between ‘reasonable’ and ‘radical’ civil 
society organisations in Africa; and shift the blame to governments and 
citizens for the inevitable failure.51
All of these regional and continental lessons have bearing upon South Africa, where as discussed 
below, similar trends can be expected to surface in times of increasing austerity. But they also help 
explain the out-migration from many desperate sites in the region, given the failure of civil society in 
most of Africa to generate sufficient advocacy strength to change the policies causing the crises. No 
matter how many ‘IMF Riots’ or how much participation in ‘Highly Indebted Poor Country’ initiative 
conferences, civil society has not shifted macroeconomic or microdevelopment policy, with the 
exception of reducing user fees for schools and clinics. Neoliberalism has proved too durable. The same 
problem exists in South Africa.
South african civil and uncivil 
society
background to a divergent civil society
As we have seen, during the 1980s and 1990s, donors began supporting civil society in developing 
countries. After decades of providing funds to governments, donors shifted the focus of their 
funding to build and support NGOs. Not only did NGOs provide an alternative to state involvement 
in development, but they were also perceived as being more grassroots oriented, sensitive to local 
dynamics, and accountable to local communities. They were praised for empowering new groups 
and strengthening civil society. 
In South Africa, the situation developed in reverse. At the time of South Africa’s transition to democracy 
between 1990 and 1994, the number and diversity of NGOs in South Africa was exceptional due to 
the phenomenal growth of NGOs as anti-apartheid organizations in the 1980s. Local NGOs were 
formed in South Africa to challenge aspects of apartheid and to channel resources to black people. 
These organisations were typically run and staffed by white people from radical, progressive and 
liberal political traditions. International NGOs mainly worked through local NGOs, and did not have 
a presence of their own. 
51 Dembe Dembele (2003), ‘PRSPS: Poverty Reduction or Poverty Reinforcement?,’ Pambezuka News 136, 11 December.
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Partly as a result of South Africa’s apartheid history, South 
Africa has not only a small but influential layer 
of politically-engaged NGOs but also CBOs that 
have periodically united to become social movements. 
Local ‘civics’ that arose in townships were locally-run organisations that responded to the daily 
concerns of people’s lives but also placed them in the larger context, mainly the fight against apartheid 
and the opportunities for local restructuring as negotiations with white authorities became possible 
after 1990. The South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) organised civics as a national 
movement starting in 1992. Today most CBOs can be characterised as one of the following types: 
coping or survival; income generation; service delivery, governance, and advocacy; and culture, youth 
and sport. They have the added value of being closer to the people, being their own spokespersons, 
and avoiding the patriarchal approach of whites that is often part of the apartheid legacy. 
With the end of apartheid, donors were keen to support the new legitimate government and 
looked to the new government to direct development. The pendulum swung from civil society 
playing a central role in development to government asserting its control. The expectation that 
the State Presidency’s Reconstruction and Development Programme Office would support civil 
society through direct or indirect funding was disappointed by 1995. NGOs were left with two 
main options for indigenous funding: local government or government tenders. The RDP Office 
envisaged that new local government councils would implement projects, drawing upon NGOs to 
assist with implementation. Indeed, some NGOs began to work with new councils once they were in 
place. However few councils were in the position to provide funding to NGOs due to their own lack 
of resources and capacity, and many NGOs reported that councilors felt threatened by NGOs and 
preferred to work with consultants.52 The main way for NGOs to access government funding was 
through the tendering process. NGOs struggled to obtain funding from government departments, 
which often considered them as competition and tried to exert stricter control over NGOs.53 
As a result of donors’ shift in focus to government, NGOs faced a significant decrease in resources. The 
survival of NGOs was threatened by more than 60 percent of senior staff moving to government and 
the private sector after 1990.54 At the same time, the shift of funds to government resulted in a loss of 
funding by many NGOs.55 It has been argued that a number of NGOs did not pursue developmental 
aims and that it was fitting that they were forced to close. However the loss of funding did not 
discriminate between NGOs, and many deserving institutions also closed. The depth or extent of this 
pattern is unknown since no comprehensive study has been done on funding to NGOs and no data 
have been gathered.56 
52 Mary Galvin (1999), “Rural Local Government in South Africa”, Transformation.
53 Hein Marais (1998), South Africa Limits to Change: the political economy of transformation, Zed Books, London.
54 Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor (1999), “South Africa: Anti-Apartheid NGOs in Transition”, Voluntas: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations.
55 A study of nearly 150 NGOs conducted by the Independent Development Trust in the mid-1990s is often referred to as 
evidence.
56 In 1993, the Development Resource Centre estimated that the non-profit sector in South Africa received R10 billion, 
however it is not clear how this figure was constructed and no comparable data is available for the post-transition period. 
The state’s Development Cooperation Reports have detailed amounts of bilateral aid flows alone. It is hoped that a study 
being completed through Johns Hopkins University will produce useful data in this regard.
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Although it is always dangerous to generalize, many NGOs that survived the decline in available 
resources were gradually transformed through four inter-related changes: they became less 
accountable to their constituents, their identity shifted, their relationship with government was 
redefined, and their capacity to deliver declined. In order to survive financially, NGOs increased 
their levels of professionalization to compete with private agencies for government tenders. While 
shaping their activities to meet tender requirements, NGO aims were increasingly subsumed by the 
agendas of government departments, sometimes stretching mission statements past recognition. 
Ideologically, there were also important shifts. As the government shifted right with the 1996 
adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme, which embodied the neoliberal 
programmes of the International finance (the World Bank was coauthor), NGOs were also pulled in 
this direction. Alternatively, NGOs responded to decreases in funding with attempts to become self-
sufficient. They began to market their services and treat beneficiaries as clients. Once NGOs began 
to charge for services, the profile of beneficiaries began to change from the poor to those who were 
able to pay. Professionalization changed the focus of NGOs away from those they previously served, 
and made them less accountable to local people.57
Gradually these changes resulted in a shift in NGO identities. Although many NGOs tried to hang 
onto their progressive nature and avoid becoming pseudo-consulting agencies, they often found 
themselves sliding into a more product-oriented, technical bent.58 
The level of commitment that previously characterized NGO 
workers was slowly replaced by a careerist attitude 
whereby NGOs were a stepping stone to better 
jobs.59 
A number of progressive NGO workers became disillusioned with NGO dynamics, which tended to 
include bartering over cellphone and car allowances, and began to act as independent consultants. 
At the other extreme, some NGO workers found that working as independent consultants would 
allow them to avoid NGO constraints, while being far more lucrative.
During this period, NGOs redefined their relationship with the government. Michael Bratton and 
Chris Landsburg argue that government-NGO partnerships are undermining the pluralism and 
independence of the NGO sector. 60 Put bluntly, many NGOs have developed a new ‘client’ relationship 
with government. With this new role NGOs become an arm of the state or are co-opted to some 
degree, which has weakened NGOs’ ability to provide critical voices and to serve as government 
watchdogs. They face the danger of being seen, or becoming what Adam Habib terms ‘agents of 
control, of being co-opted to neoliberal agendas, becoming the ‘community face’ of neoliberalism’.61
57 Adam Habib, Op cit., p.79.
58 Brian Murphy (2000), “International NGOs and the Challenge of Modernity”, Development in Practice, p.330-347.
59 Hermien Kotze (1999), “Swimming in a Wild Sea: The New Challenges Facing Civil Society”, In Between Unity and Diversity, 
Edited by G.Maharaj, David Phillip, Cape Town.
60 Michael Bratton and Chris Landsburg (1998), “Trends in Aid to South Africa”, Indicator South Africa, p.59-69.
61 Adam Habib, Op cit., p.80.
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One of the main effects of the swing in the pendulum to government control of development was an 
overall loss of initiative and development momentum. Kotze argues that although some NGOs may 
have been problem ridden, there was not much else in place, nothing to replace them, and things 
started to fall through the cracks in terms of delivery. Another effect was the loss of development 
capacity in civil society. For years, NGOs had been part of international and national networks, and 
had developed a sense of needs on the ground and of what works. Now the loss of expertise and 
experience resulted in a general loss of capacity in civil society.62 
More radical civics also felt the loss of a layer of NGOs, such as those in the Urban Sector Network, from 
serving the base to serving the state. That, in turn, meant that the wave of service delivery protests 
that began in early 1997 in Johannesburg and quickly spread to the East Rand and across the Eastern 
Cape and many other sites by 1998, had no systemised advocacy or negotiating support comparable 
to the way civics used NGOs earlier in the decade. Although ‘new social movements’ emerged in 
1999 (Durban) and 2000 (Johannesburg and Cape Town), either they subsequently faded away 
entirely or at best, in the case of the Anti-Privatisation Forum, did not sustain their radical grassroots 
networking potential. A gap had opened that a decade later became acute: communities in protest 
did not tap into a process for consolidation of grievances, formulation of demands, finding leverage 
and solidarity, and achieving successes in negotiations. They were simply left atomised, to fight in 
each locale as best they could. In some respects, the turn to xenophobic behaviour within service 
delivery protests reflects this lack of networked leadership, strategic harmonisation, ideological 
development and solidarity associated with movements. The paucity of NGOs of the type which had 
earlier charactertised Urban Sector Network support to civics is, in part, to blame. 
Hence what was also evident was a shift in political opportunity for civil society organisations to 
engage in the public sphere. Patrick Heller argues that: ‘The consolidation of a dominant nationalist 
political party, the expansion of representative institutions and bureaucratic power at the expense 
of more participatory forms of democracy, and the atomizing effects of market liberalization have all 
contributed to constricting the spaces and channels through which civil society, and in particular the 
urban poor, can shape the public sphere’.63 So while the liberal notion of NGO engagement with the 
state was proving highly problematic, and technical NGOs became increasingly engaged in delivery, 
the focus and identity of civil society in South Africa shifted. 
Many advocacy or social change NGOs 
continued to operate, focusing on the promotion of 
people’s rights, and working in conjunction with the new 
generation of social movements that arose. 
One major reason was the rise of the social protest movement within South Africa, a factor worth a 
substantial commentary, given the danger that protest becomes an excuse for ethnic cleansing. This 
raises, first, the question of ‘civil’ versus ‘uncivil’ society.
62 Hermien Kotze (1999), Op cit.
63 Heller (2007), p.13.
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civil and uncivil society boundaries
Some have tried to come to terms with this wide range of civil society in South Africa by positing 
a divide between civil and uncivil society. Whether a CSO is civil or uncivil relates primarily to its 
position vis a vis the state and its tactics. Civil CSOs play by the rules and engage with the state; in 
contrast Uncivil CSOs work in clear opposition to the state, and regularly engage in social protest. 
Given South Africa’s struggle history and its legacy of seeing the world in binaries, there is a tendency 
toward this sort of dichotomy. The moral righteousness of Uncivil society is attractive to many; the 
question is whether ‘progress’ can be made while sustaining this positioning. 
This is a matter of unpacking the grey area along the continuum, between technical and social change 
organisations. Clearly the assimilation of many CSOs and leaders into the neoliberal state is not the 
complete picture. As Robins shows, there was also a rise of NGO-social movement partnerships that 
sought to appropriate the language of rights in order to challenge the state, to assert rights, and to 
access resources for health, land, housing, water, electricity and other such basic needs.64 
Advocacy for life-saving AIDS medicines is one of the most interesting cases, because it entailed 
a highly successful mode of relating to the state and ruling party on the one hand, and the base 
on the other, via campaigns against global capital, foreign governments and leading elements 
of the South African state. The South African government’s 1997 Medicines Act – which made 
provision for compulsory licensing of patented drugs – helped to catalyse the formation in 1998 
of a Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) that lobbies for AIDS drugs, which in the late 1990s were 
prohibitively expensive for nearly all South Africa’s HIV-positive people (who number roughly 
10% of the 50 million current population). That campaign was immediately confronted by the US 
State Department’s ‘full court press’ against the Medicines Act (the formal description to the US 
Congress), in large part to protect intellectual property rights generally, and specifically to prevent 
the emergence of a parallel inexpensive supply of AIDS medicines that would undermine lucrative 
Western markets.65 The pressure included US Vice President Al Gore’s direct intervention with SA 
government leaders to revoke the law in 1998-99. In July 1999, Gore launched his 2000 presidential 
election bid, a campaign generously funded by big pharmaceutical corporations (which in a prior 
election cycle provided $2.3 million to the Democratic Party). As an explicit counterweight, TAC’s 
allies in the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP) began to protest at Gore’s campaign events. 
The protests ultimately threatened to cost Gore far more in adverse publicity than he was raising in 
Big Pharma contributions, so he changed sides and withdrew his opposition to the Medicines Act, as 
did Bill Clinton a few weeks later at the World Trade Organisation’s Seattle Summit. 
Big Pharma did not give up, and filed a 1999 lawsuit against the constitutionality of the Medicines Act, 
counterproductively entitled ‘Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Nelson Mandela’ (which 
even Wall Street Journal editorialists found offensive). The case came to court in early 2001. By, April 
additional TAC solidarity protests against pharmaceutical corporations in several cities by Medicins 
sans Frontiers, Oxfam and other TAC solidarity groups compelled the Association to withdraw the suit. 
64 Robins (2008a).
65 Patrick Bond (1999) and Nicoli Nattrass (2004), Op cit.
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By late 2001, the Doha Agenda of the World Trade Organisation adopted explicit language permitting 
violation of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights for medical emergencies. The South African 
government remained reluctant to provide medicines, however, for a variety of dubious reasons in part 
related to ‘denialism’ that HIV causes AIDS. As a result, the TAC was compelled to file a Constitutional 
Court case which succeeded in mid-2001 in at least gaining access to Nevirapine for pregnant, HIV+ 
women in public hospitals. At the same time, however, Anglo American Corporation – one of South 
Africa’s strongest promoters of CSR - released a study showing that only 12% of their employees met 
a cost-benefit test by which supply of drugs was cheaper to the company than allowing HIV+ workers 
to die early (replacing them from the pool of 40% unemployed). Threats not only from TAC but also the 
main mining trade union forced Anglo to reverse its decision to deny most workers medicines, in 2002. 66 
 
But the SA government’s footdragging was costly. It was 2004 before the government issued its 
first tenders for AIDS medicines, and given the drop in prices due to generics since that time, ‘by 
the end of 2007 the government was paying almost twice as much as the private sector for first-
line drugs like Nevirapine’, according to a United Nations report. In 2008, the South African Joint 
Civil Society Monitoring Forum of health, human rights and law organisations complained of 
‘serious shortcomings with the [AIDS medicines] tender process and the specifications’, including 
further delays that would lead to far more paid from public resources than was necessary (IRIN 
2008). Hence, even though more than 400,000 South Africans received medicines by that point, 
this was below the trajectory needed to reach the target of 1.3 million patients with access 
by 2011. The combination of a lethargic state and persistent pharmaceutical corporate power 
meant groups like the AIDS Law Project (based at the Wits Centre for Applied Legal Studies, and 
associated with TAC) continued their campaign for decommodified medicines, gradually winning 
patent battles in the courts so as to promote local generic production of individual medicines. 
 
While there is some disagreement on how the borders between civil and uncivil society are 
policed, Michael Neocosmos and many others have found a theoretical way around the realization 
of post-Gramscian writers that civil-society often functions to directly capture, channel, co-opt 
radical social impulses in society. Neocosmos (2008) compares TAC and the Durban shackdwellers 
movement Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM): ‘While TAC has been able to provide the conditions for 
the access to treatment of greater numbers of people, it has succeeded in doing so ultimately at 
the expense of reinforcing a culture of political passivity. This has arguably been largely because of 
its insistence in operating within civil society, within the state domain of politics’.67 In contrast, AbM 
‘politics have remained squarely outside civil society-ie. it has steadfastly refused to enter the realm 
of state and donor politics-relying rather on the commitment of a leadership drawn from its own 
ranks, democratic decision-making, and a rejection of state cooption and donor funding when this 
threatened to compromise its independence’.68 By 2008, the AbM approach had changed substantially, 
but the point is that such differentiation exists as an ideal-type form of Civil versus Uncivil Society. 
66 Patrick Bond (2005), Talk left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms, University of Natal Press, Durban.
67 Neocosmos (2008), Op cit, pp.48-49.
68 Ibid.
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Arguing that this is a simplistic differentiation, Ashwin Desai observes, 
Within the collapsing and trite theoretical world of good civil society 
versus bad state and market, we now have good uncivil society and bad 
civil society. While civil society it is argued by people like Neocosmos 
seeks reform; is essentially plaintiff, if not polite, towards power; is content 
to work largely within established systems of dispute resolution; and 
seeks a better market or state share for its sectional interests, uncivil 
society is the opposite. Uncivil society is characterized by anti-systemic, 
sometime downright revolutionary impulses and actions; it is militant 
and confrontational vis a vis power, indeed exercising counter-power of 
its own; and seeks far-reaching, communal and principled transformation 
and democratization of market or state interests. Put in classic South 
African terms, civil-society are sell-outs and collaborators while uncivil-
society continue with the struggle the national liberation movements have 
abandoned to being in government.69 
Many ‘uncivil society’ groups in South Africa, especially those representing the interests of sections 
of the poor, begin by posing demands that can scarcely be met without revolution and certainly 
not without a strong social democracy. These demands are pursued by engaging market and state 
forces in a militant manner. Desai describes how all the best traditions of the anti-apartheid struggle 
form part of uncivil society’s imaginary: ‘long marches, silken red banners, burning barricades, 
martyrs out on bail and threats of ungovernability’. Yet these social movements undergo noticeable 
changes within a relatively short period. While the form that their politics takes remains true to the 
anti-systemic, protest-orientated roots, and indeed often is trapped in this method since no other 
channels are available to them – the substance of their politics liberalizes considerably. Hilhorst 
highlights a similar phenomenon faced by NGOs: 
Once NGOs are formed, they acquire realities of their own, moving away 
from their founding rationale and often becoming more important for the 
actors involved than originally intended. NGOs appear as an amalgam 
of different discourses, relations and ambitions. This multiplicity is partly 
related to political opportunities, changing state-society relations and 
changing discourses in the world’s development communities.70
In this hotly contested context, the nature of social protest itself must be examined, for the change 
in political orientation by civil society actors such as NGOs and social movements then leaves gaps 
filled by potentially progressive, but also potentially reactionary political forces.
69 Desai (2010), Op cit.
70 Hilhorst (2003), p.217.
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uncivil protest prior to 2000
South Africa has arguably the highest rate of protest action in the world. In the debate on the role 
and nature of civil society some light might be shed from a consideration of the widespread protests 
that pepper the South African landscape.71 Working class communities fighting for the satisfaction 
of their basic needs are also, sometimes, fighting for the exclusion of others viewed as competitors in 
the struggle to access state services, whether in demarcation struggles over provincial boundaries, 
or xenophobic attacks.72 
Protests and the social movements that organize them influence and are influenced by a society’s 
political culture, and participation facilitates the formation of new identities and ways of thinking 
that can contribute to positive or negative social change.73 South Africa has a distinctive history of 
the use of mass mobilization to achieve popular ends. Protests and mass action characterized its 
political history from the early 20th century until the present. People have taken to the streets in 
marches, demonstrations or the erection of barricades, with the aim of winning political, economic 
or social demands. It is possible to identify and delineate waves of mass mobilization that took place 
during different periods of the country’s political history: military resistance during the 19th century 
wars of conquest, the strikes and worker action that convulsed the 1920’s, the defiance campaign 
demonstrations of the 1950’s, the student uprisings and resurgence of strike action in the 1970’s, and 
the call in the 1980’s to make South Africa ungovernable that contributed to the apartheid regime’s 
decision to take the path of negotiation instead of pure repression.
Throughout these struggles we can detect varying forms and methods of organization, discern 
different and sometimes conflicting political perspectives and, with hindsight, make evaluations 
of the effectiveness and strengths/weaknesses of the struggles. The struggle in South Africa 
engendered one of the greatest international solidarity movements in history with many civil society 
organizations in different countries denouncing apartheid and exerting pressure on their respective 
governments and corporations to do the same.74 
The post-apartheid ANC-led government has reshaped South African state-civil society relations.75 
This reshaping took place in a context where ‘a democratic South Africa has restored and advanced 
the power of capital over society’76 and was driven by ANC and state practices that began to ‘disable 
civil society and truncate democracy into a narrow representative form’77 leading to a situation where 
‘a wider conception of participatory democracy was lost in post-apartheid South Africa’.78
71 ‘Civil society organizations exist as a cartridge between the state and society’. Steve Ouma, ‘Civil society and the nation-
state – The case of Kenya’, Development Dialogue, No. 49, November 2007, p.1100.
72 There are protests against the government for lack of ‘service delivery’, there are also protests against re-demarcation 
into provinces (and people) viewed as poorer and there are the xenophobic attacks aimed at getting rid of African 
immigrants.
73 Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison (1991), Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Policy Press, Cambridge. ‘Social 
movements are thus best conceived of as temporary public spaces, as moments of collective creation that provide 
societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals.’, p. 4.
74 Dennis Brutus famously organized the sports boycott against the apartheid regime. 
75 Satgar (2008), Op cit.
76 Satgar (2008), Op cit, p.42.
77 Satgar (2008), Op cit, p.45.
78 Satgar, 2008: 45)
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For the majority of South Africans, the end of apartheid was the beginning of a promising new era after 
decades of struggle. However, once the new government was in place, it developed an ambiguous 
attitude towards civil society activism and protest politics. Political leaders seemed to consider 
protest action as an aberration in the democratic ‘new South Africa’, making a sharp distinction 
between the old illegitimate government and the new people’s government. It was suggested that 
mass mobilization should be used to support government programmes and positions rather than 
oppose them. Where people insisted on protesting it was expected that such action would be orderly 
and ‘non-disruptive’. Since protests might weaken ‘our’ government, other ways had to be found to 
draw attention to things the government might be missing or doing wrong.79 In addition, there was 
an anxiety about the perceived carry-over of the politics of protest and resistance from the past into 
the present era. For example, the new government felt it necessary to organize against the ‘culture of 
non-payment’ and in this respect launched a special campaign (‘Masakhane’: let us build together/
each other) to teach people to pay for services and to end the mentality that drove the boycott of 
service payments during apartheid.
There were certainly some important residues of civil society protest against former allies who went 
into government in 1994. A list of civil society’s critiques of 1994-99 ministerial decisions by civil 
society reflects the durability of protest strategies in a context of growing grievances and unmet 
expectations:
Those most often in the firing line were the ANC economic team. Manuel 
and his bureaucrats were condemned by left critics not only for sticking so 
firmly to Gear when all targets (except inflation) were missed, but also for 
sometimes draconian fiscal conservatism; for leaving VAT intact on basic 
goods, and amplifying his predecessors’ tax cuts favouring big firms and 
rich people; for real (after-inflation) cuts in social spending… Likewise, 
minister of trade and industry Alec Erwin was attacked for the deep 
post-1994 cuts in protective tariffs leading to massive job loss…; for… 
allowing the neoliberal agenda to prevail on issues such as the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments and continuing structural adjustment 
philosophy; for giving out billions of rands in ‘supply-side’ subsidies 
(redirected RDP funds) for Spatial Development Initiatives, considered 
‘corporate welfare’; for cutting decentralisation grants which led to the 
devastation of ex-bantustan production sites;… 
Land affairs and agriculture minister Derek Hanekom was jeered by 
emergent farmers associations and rural social movements for failing 
to redirect agricultural subsidies; for allowing privatisation of marketing 
79 . The management of protests changed under the post-apartheid government. Protests were allowed but had to adhere 
to strict procedures and regulations. 
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boards; for redistributing a tiny amount of land… Housing minister Sankie 
Mthembi-Mahanyele (and her former Director-General Billy Cobbett and 
indeed Joe Slovo before his 1995 death) came under fire from the civic 
movement for lack of consultation, insufficient housing subsidies; for 
‘toilets-in-the-veld’ developments far from urban opportunities;… 
Welfare minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi was bitterly criticised by a 
church, NGO and welfare advocacy movement for attempting to cut the 
child maintenance grant by 40 per cent; and for failing to empower local 
community organisations and social workers. Education minister Sibusiso 
Bengu was censured by teachers unions, the student movement and 
movement education experts for often incompetent - and typically not 
sufficiently far-reaching - restructuring policies; for failure to redistribute 
resources fairly; and for a narrow, instrumentalist approach to higher 
education. Minister of constitutional development Valli Moosa was 
condemned by municipal workers and communities unhappy with the 
frightening local government fiscal squeeze; for intensifying municipal 
water cut-offs; for the privatisation of local services (on behalf of which 
he tried to divide-and- conquer workers and community activists); for 
low infrastructure standards (such as mass pit latrines in urban areas)… 
Water minister Kader Asmal earned the wrath not only of unions for his 
privatised rural water programme, but also of beneficiary communities 
for whom the majority of the new taps quickly broke (the vast majority 
of waterless South Africans remained without water, notwithstanding 
Asmal’s RDP commitment to supply all with at least emergency supplies); 
and he was condemned by environmentalists and Gauteng community 
activists for stubbornly championing the unneeded Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project expansion. 
Defense minister Joe Modise and deputy minister Ronnie Kasrils were 
denounced for their R30 billion ‘toys-for-boys’ approach to rearmament 
(with obfuscating ‘spinoffs’ justification); as well as for arms sales to 
repressive regimes in and beyond Africa. Likewise, intelligence head Joe 
Nhlanhla was criticised for not shaking up the National Intelligence 
Agency, which cannibalised itself in spy versus spy dramas. Safety 
and security minister Sydney Mufamadi was considered weak for not 
transforming policing services more thoroughly (thus generating active 
protest from the Popcru union); for allocating far more resources to 
Synthesis Ð
30
Problematising civil society: on what terrain does xenoPhobia flourish?
fighting crime in white neighbourhoods and downtown areas than in 
townships; for allowing a top-down managerial approach to overwhelm 
potential community-based policing; and for failing to sustain his battle 
with George Fivas. 
To be sure, there were occasions when at least one minister, Dlamini-
Zuma, revelled in (and was praised by civil society activists for) taking 
on extremely powerful corporations and vested interests. Yet as noted, 
these fights also showed a penchant for going it virtually alone, bringing 
on board none of Dlamini-Zuma’s likely civil society allies. In that 
context, her public image as a heat-seeking missile was never effectively 
countered, even though it would not have hard to have positioned herself 
as intermediary between protesting grassroots social movements and 
corporate titans. And this indeed sums up the broader character of ‘talk-
left, act-right’ politics; for even the exception proves the rule.80 
In this context, some commentators argue that the role of civil society itself was reviewed and 
found not to be always good for ‘development’.81 Many civil society organizations such as student 
organizations, churches, womens’ groups and civics were seen as having played their (anti-apartheid) 
role and had to give way to the new democratic government to govern. The ANC, as head of the 
national liberation movement, closed down many organisations that epitomized the characteristic 
vibrancy and militancy of civil society under apartheid. The biggest and most important organization 
that was closed down was the United Democratic Front, in 1992; this was justified on the grounds of 
the ‘new balance of forces’ and the strategic imperatives of the new political situation. In hindsight, 
it seems that there was a deliberate weakening of civil society by the new government in order to 
undermine opposition to its unpopular (pro-big business) policies.82 As a result, the vast majority 
were robbed of their agency and reduced to be either spectators or supporters of the unfolding 
political process in which ANC leaders knew best and had to be left to lead. A lull in mass mobilization 
and protests ensued. 
Despite the regular claims of a vibrant South African civil society, it is important not to ignore that 
post-apartheid changes in the social, economic and political power dynamics have negatively 
affected civil society. In particular, the shaping of post-apartheid state-civil society relations have 
resulted into a purposeful, smart and energetic state agenda to manufacture consent for the strategic, 
moral and intellectual leadership of society. As a result, ‘counter-hegemonic capacities in civil society’ 
80 Patrick Bond (2005).
81 ‘An oft-asked question by those in power was: what do we need civil society for now that we have a government of the 
people? ... Civil society organisations were seen as at best a nuisance and at worst a threat to the democratic government.’ 
Xolela Mangcu, To The Brink: The State of Democracy in South Africa, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Durban, p. 123.
82 Vishnu Padayachee and Graham Sherbat (2009), ‘Ideas and power: academic economists and the making of economic 
policy’ in William Gumede and Leslie Dikeni, The Poverty of Ideas: South African Democracy and the Retreat of Intellectuals, 
Jacana, Auckland Park. Also, Xolela Mangcu, Op cit.
31
Problematising
were ‘denuded’ and the concept of mass initiative ‘has increasingly become constrained and kept 
out of the policy and political process’.83 Robins also notes the centrality of the ANC and government 
patronage networks in many of the social movements and civil society activities including those that 
may even appear to be against the state. 84 According to Satgar, this represents an ANC-led process 
of mass demobilisation, instrumentalisation and bureaucratisation which was part of a wider ANC-
led neoliberalisation of South Africa. 85 However Kgara asserts that this process was an ‘ongoing 
process rather than a completely actualized regime’ and was characterised contradictions and 
certain adaptations of neoliberalism in ways that corresponded to prevailing and sensitive socio-
political developments. He argues that this saw an ANC and government that articulated neoliberal 
policies ‘more in relation to their projected outcomes and less in relation to their underpinning 
values and principle’.86 The most important political implication arising out of this is how civil society 
got transformed away from democratic practices and tendencies with sections of civil society 
organisations and leaders increasingly assimilated into institutional politics within the state.87
When the ANC government announced in 1996 that it was abandoning the mildly redistributive 
RDP in favour of the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic 
policy, it was clear to many that the post apartheid redistribution of wealth depended on a trickle-
down model. This would mean that the people would not agin the economic benefits of freedom 
and democracy or, in some instances, would involve the loss of benefits enjoyed under apartheid.88 
This development laid the basis for the rebirth of the protest movement in the new democratic 
South Africa. The first wave of protests took place around and immediately after liberation. This first 
wave consisted of the ‘popcorn civics’ that dotted the political scene for a short while. These groups 
protested sporadically, but there were enough of them to form a trend. They involved expressing 
dissatisfaction with what we now call ‘service delivery’, namely, municipal services, housing, roads, 
etc. Some of the ‘popcorn’ protests seem to have been organized by new community organisations 
that were independent of the ANC and its alliance partners, including its civic arm, the South African 
National Civics Organisation. 
The first wave of protests post 1994 were organised by local civics. Most communities developed 
local civics during apartheid, whose nature depended on the particular history and dynamics of the 
area and the character of the local leadership. However, many of these grassroots organizations were 
gradually hegemonised by the ‘Congress tradition’ as the struggle against apartheid peaked and it 
became clear that the ANC was going to be the new ruling party in South Africa.89 The ushering in of 
the new government and the excitement surrounding this raised expectations, a development that 
might have accentuated frustration leading to protests. The popcorn (or ‘mushroom’) protests were 
83 Satgar (2008), Op cit, p.53.
84 Robins (2008). Op cit.
85 Satgar (2008). Op cit.
86 Kgara (2007). Op cit.
87 Satgar (2008). Op cit.
88 Many workers lost their jobs when trade liberalization was introduced. Many residents who had untrammelled access to 
water suffered when pre-paid meters were installed. Communities that had lived in certain areas were forcibly removed. 
All this was happening under the new government. 
89 The Congress tradition refers to that part of the national liberation movement that followed the politics of the ANC. 
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marked by a degree of militancy such as in Tembisa township, on the East Rand, where residents 
invented ‘Operation Khanyisa’, re-connecting themselves to the electricity grid after being cut off 
for non-payment.90 It is likely that many creative collective actions were taken by communities 
responding to the openness of this transitional period. For example, there was a sudden increase in 
the number of informal settlements in the country as people invaded land and put up their shacks. 
Some of these new settlements were set up by ANC local leaders inspired by and sometimes seeking 
or receiving encouragement and patronage from senior leaders, hence the naming of many informal 
settlements after ANC leaders (Mandelaville informal settlement, Elias Motsoaledi, Ramaphosa, Joe 
Slovo, etc.) These land invasions can be viewed as a generative form of mass action that went beyond 
protesting as such. 
The response of the state to protest during these early 
post-apartheid days was to foster the regimentation, 
ritualisation and emasculation of the protest 
action. 
Protest action increasingly took the form of marches which the authorities contained making use of 
the Public Gatherings Act. Elaborate procedures had to be followed to have a march. This included 
protest organizers having meetings with the police where the route and times of the protest would 
be negotiated. The authorities did not always respond positively or with urgency to the obligatory 
memorandum of grievances that was handed over by the marchers.91 
The one-day anti-privatisation general strikes by COSATU that took place towards the end of the 
1990’s did not lead to a change in government policy. Privatization continued with many government 
workers ‘outsourced’, that is, removed from the government payroll and employed by contract 
companies and labour brokers. One result of the struggle by labour was the formation of the Anti-
Privatisation Forum in 2000 when two struggles against privatization merged, namely, the struggles 
against the privatization plans of the Johannesburg City Council and those of Wits University. The 
APF combined community, student and labour organizations in a joint struggle against privatization. 
It was a body that would be part of the next wave of protest action that took hold of the country 
organized by the ‘new social movements’.92 
new Social movements from 2000-2010
The rise of protest action and mass mobilizations organized by a spate of newly-formed organizations, 
called the ‘new social movements’, such as the APF, the Treatment Action Campaign, Landless Peoples 
Movement and others, heralded another wave of struggle in South Africa. These organizations gained 
prominence in the early 2000’s as the government’s change of macroeconomic policy began to have 
90 This liberation or communing of electricity by communities was made famous by the Soweto Electricity Crisis Commmittee, 
an affiliate of the Anti-Privatisation Forum.
91 The government has acknowledged the failure to respond to communities’ grievances over the years. Many communities 
claim that they erupted into violent protests after knocking many times on the doors of local authorities. 
92 It is important to note that for a moment the trade unions worked closely with community organizations in the anti-
privatisation campaign. That moment was lost. 
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concrete consequences for the masses; for example, the policy of cost recovery in the provision of 
basic services meant that people had to pay steeply rising prices for essential services such as water 
and electricity. 
The rise of the new social movements in South Africa coincided with the rise of the anti-globalisation 
(anti-capitalist) movement that dramatically entered into the history books in Seattle in November 
1999. 
This global movement tremendously transformed 
conceptions of civil society. 
New social movement activism in South Africa shared some of the characteristics, strengths and 
weaknesses of the global movement, and the decline of the new social movements in South Africa has 
broadly coincided with that of the international movement. The South African movement adopted 
some of the approaches and characteristics of the global movement and as a result, shared its failure 
to transform mass mobilization and support into a power that can influence policy by shaping (or 
controlling) governments.93 In South Africa the new social movements also faced the hostility of 
the state with President Thabo Mbeki leading the attack and sternly admonishing Alliance against 
these movements. As a result the labour movement and the new social movements failed to work 
together, no doubt weakening the struggle.94
The current wave of mass action consists of local 
community uprisings and militant national 
strikes. 
The winter of 2004 appeared to be a crucial breakpoint, as several communities erupted in violent 
protest beginning with Diepsloot, north of Johannesburg, followed by Intabazwe, Harrismith, in 
the Free State province, sparking off protests in many other small towns. The struggles were mainly 
over housing, roads, electricity, water and related issues. Protests spread to the Eastern and Western 
Cape, Gauteng and to other provinces, notably Mpumalanga. The peculiar characteristics of these 
community protests were established quite early on: they tend to have broad support and involve a 
big section of the community, they are often violent and disruptive and their demands relate to the 
provision of basic services, the accountability of councilors and corruption. However the eruptions 
quickly became referred to as ‘service delivery protests’, and they have steadily increased in number 
since 2004, apparently peaking even after Zuma’s election in April 2009 and showing no sign of 
abating.95 
The struggle of the Khutsong community forms part of this latest wave, and was crucial because of 
lessons learned from the activists’ victory. This community fought against re-demarcation into the 
North West Province away from Gauteng. Their grievance was linked to a perception that there would 
93 The victory of Morales in Bolivia, Lula in Brazil and Chavez in Venezuela has been seen by some as broadly related to, 
among other things, the ascendancy of the anti-globalisation movement. 
94 Trade unions that were part of the Anti-Privatisation Forum pulled out one by one, without explanation, leaving this body 
constituted by community structures. Student organizations also pulled out.
95 Further research is needed to quantify the protests. In the last month or so there has been a spurt of protests.
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be ‘less service delivery’ in the former province and objection to the top-down and ‘arrogant’ manner 
the ANC government handled the matter. Khutsong had one of the most militant and successful 
struggles in post-apartheid South Africa. What is not widely known is that demarcation struggles 
underlie many more protests than is usually assumed. Although we know of Moutse’s and Matatiele’s 
demarcation struggles, the uprisings in Balfour, Harrismith and Standerton also have grievances 
related to demarcation politics. These are struggles of exclusion and inclusion, and of belonging and 
non-belonging - about disputes around definitions of political citizenship. 
A strike wave accompanied the latest wave of community protests although there is no clear or 
immediate connection between the strikes and the uprisings. In 2007 workers took to the streets 
in the biggest public sector strike in the history of South Africa. There were also several important 
national strikes in the private sector which were mostly bitter, protracted and often violent, such 
as the security workers’ strike during which several workers were killed. This is a reflection of the 
desperation of the strikers, the legacy of apartheid violence and the failure of the trade union 
leadership to give proper support to the strikes and to guide the membership. 
As a result, there is no united movement of struggle that brings together the various sporadic 
outbursts. Indeed, even the trade union movement has failed, except with respect to the public 
sector strike, to co-ordinate a united strike wave let alone solidarity with the community uprisings. 
A brief assessment of the attitude of civil society to the protests reveals that the labour movement 
is ambivalent and sometimes hostile to the protests; mainstream political parties such as the ANC 
are hostile; the churches have not pronounced themselves clearly on this subject; student and youth 
organizations exhibit a mixed reaction although youth are in at the forefront of the protests; and 
cultural and sports bodies are also largely quiet on the matter.96 Recently we are now seeing repeat 
uprisings in many areas such as Orange Farm, Balfour and others, indicating that the problems are 
intractable. New and perhaps more radical strategies might develop as communities realize that 
setting barricades and burning tyres does not always lead to the desired change. Indeed, the past 
year has witnessed a transition from service delivery protest to expressions of xenophobia.
from protest to xenophobia
The country and the world were shocked when in May 2008 at least 62 people were killed and 
thousands displaced due to attacks on ‘foreigners’, black African working class immigrants. A 
worrisome development has been the occurrence of xenophobic attacks during anti-government 
protests around service delivery and related issues. 
Although in practice there seems to be a clear 
distinction, based on the motives and goals 
of the action, between a xenophobic riot and 
community and worker action, overlaps sometimes 
occur.
96 Prishani Naidoo argues that the student and youth movement in South Africa has been more or less emasculated away 
from fighting for broader social transformation because of its ties to the ruling party. Please see ‘Taming the young lions: 
the intellectual role of youth and student movements after 1994’ in William Gumede and Leslie Dikeni (2009), The Poverty 
of Ideas: South African Democracy and the Retreat of Intellectuals, Jacana, Auckland Park.
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In Siyathemba township, Balfour, in the Mpumalanga province, the community has twice erupted 
in violent protest demanding jobs and improvement in their area. They burnt down government 
buildings including a library. On both occasions, some protesters attacked shops belonging to 
immigrants from African countries. The structural conditions that obtain in South African working 
class communities especially in poorer areas have produced both xenophobic attacks and protests 
against the government. Some protest leaders have blamed a ‘criminal element’ that takes advantage 
of the situation in order to loot under the guise of xenophobia. In a conversation with two leading 
activists in this township it emerged that the organizers of the protests were against the attacks 
on African immigrants’ shops. But they conceded that some people with xenophobic or criminal 
intentions took advantage of the situation. One of them expressed the cynical view that if you attack 
immigrants ‘the government will come running’ because xenophobia is seen as bad for the country 
(especially in the light of the World Cup soccer games). In other research it has been reported that 
in some areas, such as Khutsong, there were no xenophobic attacks during the May 2008 wave, This 
was partly because the leadership of this community, embroiled then in militant revolt against the 
government on the demarcation issue, actively promoted tolerance and unity between South African 
born locals and immigrants in the light of their bigger common struggle to resist re-demarcation 
into the North West province.97 Research in Soweto revealed that some community organizations 
successfully influenced significant sections of their constituency to adopt anti-xenophobic positions 
including persuading people to provide moral and material support to immigrant communities 
in need.98 Leadership and agency in civil society organizations can help to mitigate the structural 
factors that might provide fertile ground for xenophobia. 
Given the existence of xenophobic attitudes and practices in South African society, the role of 
leadership in protest action ideally is to admonish against xenophobia and to espouse a politics that 
emphasizes co-habitation, tolerance and mutual respect irrespective of country of origin. Research 
seems to suggest that the possibility of hostile attitudes and attacks is reduced if there is positive 
social intercourse between different groups in society.99 There is also evidence that suggests that 
the state and the employers sometimes promote xenophobia through the manner in which they 
interact with and treat Africans not born in South Africa.100 Active steps need to be taken by civil 
society organizations to counter xenophobic attitudes and attacks. Left to themselves things will 
turn xenophobic in certain depressed areas in South Africa given the frustration of the masses and 
the tight political management of discontent by the government that leaves little room for the 
masses to ventilate and engage constructively. 
97 Joshua Kirshner and Comfort Phokela, ‘Khutsong and xenophobic violence: Exploring the case of the dog that didn’t 
bark’ in South African Civil Society Response to the Xenophobic Violence of May 2008, Atlantic Philanthropies – Centre for 
Sociological Research, University of Johannesburg, 2010. 
98 Trevor Ngwane and Nonhlanhla Vilakazi,’Social movement responses to the xenophobia: a case study of the Soweto 
Electricity Crisis Committee, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Coalition Against Xenophobia’ in South African Civil 
Society Response to the Xenophobic Violence of May 2008, Atlantic Philantrophies – Centre for Sociological Research, 
University of Johannesburg, 2010. 
99 Ngwane and Vilakazi, Op cit.
100 Police, for example, regularly ‘raid’ Africans searching for ‘illegals’ in the country. Another problem is the Department of 
Home Affairs which issues short-term work or temporary stay permits which makes the life of people unstable. Employers 
are reported to routinely pay African immigrants less money, treat them badly and work them harder than workers born 
in South Africa. This emerged from interviews with working class immigrants in the Philantrophies study quoted above.
Synthesis Ð
36
Problematising civil society: on what terrain does xenoPhobia flourish?
The xenophobia shows that organized civil society 
will not always consistently act in a progressive 
manner. 
For example, some social movement organizations had their hands full organizing against xenophobia 
and rooting out the xenophobia virus sometimes from their own members. Some of these were part 
of a broad coalition against xenophobia that was formed in Johannesburg consisting of more than 
a hundred organizations.101 At the centre of this initiative were social movement organizations such 
as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, NGOs such as the Lawyers for Human Rights, refugee groups, and at 
least one union. The leaderships actively intervened to educate and persuade their members against 
succumbing to the argument of the xenophobes.102 It seems that political intervention is necessary 
to keep civil society organizations and their members on the progressive path. 
Xenophobia needs to be fought and eradicated and research suggests that the issue of xenophobia 
should be part of the mix of things that communities or unions organizing and planning protest 
action discuss in their meetings. Creative ways must be found to ‘mainstream’ the issue into protest 
politics. Active steps can be taken to promote tolerance, understanding and solidarity through well-
thought out programmes. For example, the needs of immigrants can be included in the demands of 
a protest so that their issue becomes everyone’s issue. Ideology is important in the type of politics 
that is deployed in mass action.103 Education and ideological training is important in civil society 
organs such as social movement organizations in order to share and develop the political values 
of the organization to the benefit of all its members. The struggle against xenophobia traverses 
all spheres of life and most of our activities can provide avenues for us to challenge and fight this 
scourge. Protest politics is one such avenue.
Identity is important in the struggle against xenophobia. Some activists who organized against 
xenophobia long before the May 2008 outbreak saw themselves as Pan Africanist and defined 
African immigrants as their ‘African brethren and sistren’. They rejected colonial borders and 
embraced Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of a ‘United States of Africa’.104 These activists also embraced 
socialist ideology going beyond the chosen identity ‘African’ and advocating international working 
class unity. The slogan of the Campaign Against Xenophobia was NO ONE ILLEGAL! This is a call to 
defend those who are harassed for papers; giving solidarity and fighting together seemed to be the 
best foundation for building tolerance and finding a common identity. 
101 Ibid.
102 One of the APF affiliates based in Alexandra, Vukuzenzele, was filmed making xenophobic statements. The APF moved 
quickly to re-affirm its anti-xenophobic stance, conducted an investigation, took disciplinary steps against the culprits 
and involved its affiliates in activities promoting solidarity with African immigrants. 
103 ‘Urban social movements take on mixed political coloration’, according to David Harvey, because of the axis of class 
struggle and ‘other axes’ of revolt and revulsion. ‘The vision of possible alternatives is put up for grabs’. Consciousness and 
the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanisation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
p. 2.
104 Ngwane and Vilakazi, ibid. 
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assessing the new protests
As witnessed in state statistics showing white people have a 24% higher income since 1994 and 
black people a -0.01% lower income, no one would disagree that the victory against racial apartheid 
was truncated. The dreams, hopes and aspirations of millions of people were only partially realized. 
The response of civil society organizations in South Africa to this development has, among other 
responses, taken the dramatic form of protests. It is not only communities demanding development, 
but also students in universities demanding access to education, sometimes it is communities 
marching against a rapist being granted bail, other times a march to support a local ‘leader’ in 
trouble with the courts, church congregations have been known to protest around internal disputes. 
However, due to time and space problems I will confine my assessment to the community uprisings 
and strikes in the post-apartheid era. 
Anti-apartheid protests died with apartheid. The political culture at the time of the democratic 
transition promoted the idea that the struggle was over and civil society organizations were even 
closed down or absorbed into ANC structures. On hindsight this was a mistake by the movement of 
struggle against apartheid. Organizations such as COSATU and SANCO handed everything to the 
ANC leaders as if it was the anointed leader of not only the alliance but of the new free society. 
They and other civil society organizations ceded all power to the ANC including the right to define 
and circumscribe what is acceptable popular action and activism. In the excitement of transition 
the movements forgot that there no guarantees in the struggle. Also, a clear class analysis of the 
transition was confounded by the blurring and confusion of national interests with class interests 
in a manner that undermined independent working class organization and action thus opening the 
door for an elite transition. 105
However, as we have shown, the protests did not entirely stop despite the new hostile political 
culture. They continued despite facing heavy odds and having their own limitations. The early 
protests faced serious problems in that the hegemony of the ANC was at its strongest as was the 
anxiety that protest action could undermine the new government. As the pejorative term ‘popcorn’ 
suggests, the protests were trivialized, marginalized and demonized. ‘Who are these people?’ the 
ANC asked. The popcorn leaders carried forward a tradition of working class combativity, they 
withstood the demobilization and pacification of the movement that was taking place during the 
political transition. By doing so they underlined the point that the South African working class was 
not defeated outright and its fighting spirit was not extinguished despite taking heavy losses during 
the transition. The ruling class granted big concessions to win the working class into supporting 
the ANC’s unsatisfactory political settlement. Later, the government developed more sophisticated 
methods of dealing with the protests including regimentation and red tape. The government also 
set its secret service onto the protests in order to keep them under surveillance. New epithets were 
coined to discredit the protests such as labeling them ‘counter-revolutionary’ and accusing them of 
being organized by the ‘ultra-left’. 
105 Patrick Bond (2000), Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, Pluto Press. 
Synthesis Ð
38
Problematising civil society: on what terrain does xenoPhobia flourish?
The birth of the new social movements requires a broader and more wide-ranging assessment 
because, as noted above, they appeared on stage as part of and hence possesses certain attributes of 
the anti-globalisation movement. This great movement was born as an expression of disappointment 
with ‘old forms of organising’ and a perceived need to invent a ‘new’ politics. However, it seems as if 
the baby of tried and tested methods of struggle was thrown out with the bathwater of mistakes 
and deviations that had severely crippled the struggle in the 20th century. The search for a stronger 
way forward necessitated a wide-ranging critique of left strategies of social change but this critique 
was arguably taken too far. 
From the anti-globalisation movement emerged a whole body of writing which shed new light 
on old problems and led to some serious revisions of existing conceptions of civil society, political 
organization and mass mobilization. 
There was an earnest search for new concepts that were 
more appropriate to the ‘globalization’ process then 
engulfing the world. 
There was also revulsion not only against capitalist sins, but also against the cardinal sins committed 
by regimes calling themselves left and Marxist such as the atrocities of Stalinism. However, this healthy 
dynamic was also undermined by some dubious philosophical and strategic choices of the new 
movements. There was an attempt to revert back to pre-Marxist ideas and approaches to struggle 
despite the limitations of these. Form got confused with content; for example, disappointment with 
left political parties was made into a theory of rejection of political parties as such. The ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’ thesis was invoked; not only were political parties bad for the struggle but, politicians, 
politics, political organization, organization itself, leaders and leaderships, trade unions, the state, 
state power, and so on, were all concepts and entities that were said to have no place in revolutionary 
politics. The failures of working class politics provoked a rejection of the notion of working class 
leadership in the struggle and went so far as to declare the working class dead. The socialist vision 
was rejected because the very notion of vision was seen as a ‘totalizing narrative’. Alex Callinicos 
and other Marxist scholars have spent a lot of time and ink pointing out the problems of post-
modernism and its intersection with left politics. 106 Solid revolutionary insights that were developed 
over decades and even centuries of struggle were discarded in favour of starting anew. But, as we 
can see today with the uncertainty of the anti-capitalist movement about the way forward, this over-
critical approach did the struggle a disservice despite its noble and revolutionary intentions. 
The ‘new social movements’ in South Africa were influenced by the anti-capitalist movement in a 
number of respects. Some of the ideas of the global movement were imported into South Africa 
together with the inspiration, solidarity and support the local movement received. One outcome 
was that some social movements stopped mourning and started to celebrate their isolation from 
organized labour and organized politics. They became centres of their own universe. Opportunities 
to work with unions and political parties were lost or not sought. Some of the movements declared 
106 See for example: Internationalism Socialism, “Can we change the world without taking power? A debate between John 
Holloway and Alex Callinicos”, World Social Forum, 27 January 2005.
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themselves ‘non-political’ which, in practice, meant an attempt to sidestep the ANC as ruling political 
party and to avoid grappling with the difficult terrain of electoral politics. The same tendency to 
sidestep rather than confront applied to the unions, the movements kept their distance from rank 
and file union members ostensibly to avoid dealing with the union leadership thus leaving workers 
in the clutches of the trade union bureaucracy.107 
The issue by issue approach seems to have pared down the vision for an alternative society. 
The struggle around localized issues and celebration 
of localism tended to discourage the unity of 
movements across struggles. 
Campaigns increasingly became inward-looking until the political field was filled with small, isolated, 
fragmented, episodic and ever weaker social movement organizations. By the time the next wave 
of protest action came along, the community uprisings, the new social movements were not in a 
position to link up with let alone lead such struggles. Some simply died. On the other hand, the 
potential of the country’s biggest public sector strike to rebuild the working class movement and 
challenge capitalist power was lost because the worker leaders made a political choice to turn the 
struggle against the ANC’s pro-capitalist anti-working class policies into a struggle to get rid of one 
leader and replace him with another (Zuma for Mbeki). No attempt was made to unite the public 
sector strike with the strikes in the private sector, something that could have taken a mere telephone 
call to achieve. The COSATU leaders displayed a politics that makes them prefer to fight for influence 
inside the ANC rather than to oppose the ruling party, that inclines them to promote a leader rather 
than the class, that predisposes them to build bridges between employers and workers rather than 
build a struggle to defeat the employers. Today COSATU, and its close ally the SACP, is in a difficult 
position politically because of this politics of class collaboration.108
With respect to the latest wave of community uprisings taking place in South Africa today, I would 
say these protests need to be celebrated because they represent the continuation of the tradition 
of mass action, they also reflect the renewal and re-awakening of working class struggle. But, as the 
occasional degeneration into xenophobia shows, there is still a dearth of visionary politics in some 
of the protests. Rather than finding the solidarity and generosity of struggle, the sharing and caring 
that comes with collectivism, we sometimes find a capitalist competitiveness: ‘It must be us who 
gets, not them. Why do they get – we are supposed to get before them. They are not supposed to 
get – we are. We were here before them. They do not belong here. If they get, they are taking away 
from us.’ During the days fighting apartheid the slogan of the movement was ‘houses for all’ because 
it was understood that if everyone gets a house I too will get a house. But today the idea is that I must 
fight hard to stop him getting a house because if he does it means I won’t get one. This is a problem 
that weakens the protest movement. 
107 J. Grossman and T. Ngwane (2005) ‘Social Movements and the Revival of the Workers’ Movement in South Africa’ 
unpublished paper.
108 COSATU leaders are suggesting that Zuma and the ANC are betraying them. It should be noted that almost all of the 
COSATU leaders are SACP members.
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Those who participated in the struggle against apartheid experienced the power of a working 
class movement moving forward in action and fired by an imagination of a different kind of future. 
The political settlement undermined this vision of a socialist future as workers were told that their 
socialist dream was not realistic and that the South African government had ‘no choice’ but to follow 
Washington Consensus ideas of development when engaging with globalization. The youth of today 
have never shared in this dream nor have they experienced the power of a working class movement 
moving forward in struggle with hope and vision. The most that has ever been offered to them is 
the hope of a benign leader; of clawing their way upwards away from their class brothers and sisters; 
of making themselves part of a favoured minority. Many community protests are lead by a youth 
deprived of the chance to imagine a radically different future. 
the missing alternative vision
Some commentators have pointed out the need to go beyond protest politics to a transformative 
or generative politics in South Africa.109 This is necessary to facilitate the conversion of defensive 
struggles into offensive attacks on vested interest with a view to laying the basis for a different kind 
of society. 
These authors celebrate protest politics but point out the 
need to have a vision of solutions rather than a 
perpetual struggle for survival, just to keep where 
you are. Resistance, it is argued, is not enough. 
We can see how important civil society movements and organizations are in the struggle for a 
humane and just society. The struggle against apartheid was won because protests contributed 
to the overall fight against the racist social system. Today’s protests are an attempt to defend and 
deepen the victory against apartheid. The new challenge for the masses of South Africa is the ANC 
government’s economic policies that favour the rich. The protest movement represents a critique of 
the trickle down model of development adopted by the ANC. Increasingly, the protests will be seen 
to herald the birth of a new type of society; a society where all forms of exploitation and oppression 
will be eradicated. This movement will succeed if, among other things, it is imbued with a vision of 
alternatives. 
The lessons from this overview of contextual terrain are numerous. First, as the varied responses to 
the May 2008 violence illustrated, there is something quite vital and inspiring about civil society. The 
big march held by CAX through the City of Johannesburg, the food parcels and tents supplied by 
faith based organizations, the proactive work against xenophobia by the SECC and the MDF, together 
represented the silver lining in what was a horrible period in post-apartheid South Africa. 
However, it is more appropriate to move now to the shortcomings observed in civil society, based 
upon a less than optimal context in which divisions of labour, ideological differences and other 
109 Michelle Williams (2008), The Roots of Participatory Democracy: Democratic Communists in South Africa and Kerala, India, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
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disputes remain important. One of the significant challenges for leaders of social movements is to 
sustain a vision that inspires and is actually subscribed to by its members. One danger is for leaders 
of social movements to claim they subscribe to or are promoting an ideology, when their members 
have little commitment or understanding of it-they simply want services or an improved lifestyle. 
These tensions are evident in the mixed actions and positions of CSOs on xenophobia. 
Nor have responses within communities by CSOs been in any ways monolithic. Khutsong, after a 
long spell of violent protests particularly in 2006, has highlighted the ability of residents themselves 
to mobilize a peaceful counterforce which could defend foreign nationals against xenophobic 
attacks. As the research paper on Khutsong illustrates key here was the way in which community-
based organisations have framed their demands, not against a minority group within Khutsong, but 
against a common cause to get Khutsong incorporated into Gauteng Province. 
While the APF, the SECC and, to some extent CAX attempted to ground their response to xenophobic 
violence in a critique against capitalism and the adoption of GEAR, the case of the APF in Alexandra 
indicates that CSO’s themselves are multi-layered. The Alexandra Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee, an 
affiliate of the APF itself, has reflected xenophobic attitudes and did not develop a clear anti-capitalist 
framework within which to deal with the issue of xenophobia. In fact, the APF’s claim, in Alexandra 
and beyond, that the constitution declares that all South Africans have the right to housing has 
provoked new discussions among leaders in the APF as to how to deal with the question of access 
to housing beyond South African citizens. COSATU too finds itself in a cross-fire of contradictory 
impulses despite its public statements condemning the attacks. Many African foreigners were 
acting as a cheap supply of labour and undercutting many gains of the movement. In addition, it 
has supported a ‘Buy South African’ campaign which could easily be said to feed into xenophobic 
sentiments, as Mondli Hlatshwayo’s research on COSATU reveals. 
Stated in another way, we find a dynamism or positive energy in some areas when issues have a 
direct relevance to people’s lives. When people are struggling for survival, they will respond to a clear 
agenda that promises to assist with meeting these needs. However, the more complex the issues, 
the more difficult it is to mobilise civil society. This explains, to some degree, why organisations 
responded to the immediate aftermath of the attacks, but otherwise engaged weakly with wider 
structural issues. 
The most important criticism that can be made of civil 
society is that it saw its response mainly restricted 
to the crisis in the immediate aftermath of the 
May 2008 violence. Can we expect any component of 
CSOs to fashion a response, when society as a whole was at 
a loss? Does civil society lead or is it a mirror of 
society? 
As the case studies show in some areas, CSOs were able to prevent attacks through incredible door 
to door campaigning, and also able to mobilize South Africans to protest xenophobia and provide 
support from tents to food to those in the camps. They have been less successful in supporting 
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those affected by the violence in terms of making fundamental inroads into xenophobic attitudes, or 
in reversing the structural conditions that lead to xenophobia. Although the resource dependence 
literature clearly helps to explain the strength and success of civil society organisations, it is a partial 
explanation at best. Having resources can clearly strengthen an organisation, but it is not a given 
that it will do so. Plenty of organisations have instead been torn apart when coping with funds. And 
of course there are many civil society organisations, particularly social movements, that have few or 
no outside resources and are incredibly strong. 
Instead we need to consider the history of the local area, and its reserve of committed individuals. 
If the area has such individuals or groups and a local ideology that is not closed to change, referred 
to as a ‘social foundation for change’, it is well positioned for change. So whatever the type of CSO, 
linking up with outsiders or obtaining support or resources can act as the spark for promoting the 
direction in which the area is poised to move. It is the socio political nature of the community rather 
than the type of CSO that ultimately matters.110 
Indeed, civil society in South Africa cannot be located outside of the social crisis of reproduction. As 
Du Toit argues, this social crisis is also about the poor being subject to local power structures and 
patronage systems from which it seems intractable to escape. This requires civil society to be located 
in broader processes within which household livelihood profiles and choices have their existence. 
‘This includes the need to properly understand intra- and inter-household conflicts and struggles, as 
well as inequalities of power and conflicts and interests’.111
Comparatively, formal associational life amongst ‘culturally’ and ‘politically’ marginal poor households 
is ‘thin, and often appears fragile and subject to conflict’.112 This lack of participation by the poor 
shows that political democratisation, transformation and service delivery has been in terms of far 
more powerful and vested interests. Part of the explanation lies in the incomplete transition of the 
poor from being ‘subjects’ into being ‘citizens’ of the democratic order and the post-1994 turning of 
the poor into ‘objects’ and passive recipients of development. More fundamentally, the state of being 
poor undermines the ability of poor people to participate fully in their own lives: poverty and the 
lack of power of poor households mutually reinforce each other. Whilst poverty may not rob the poor 
of their agency, however, it ‘circumscribes and limits the forms of agency that are available to them’.113 
This political disempowerment of poor communities weakens their capacity to challenge the very 
social, economic and political processes which marginalise them. Instead, poor people are integrated 
into the circuits and networks that marginalise them thus undermining their ability to control and 
impact upon the systems into which they are locked.114
Given the generalised marginality of the poor, the ruling party and government officials can easily 
dismisses existing civil society as elitist. This has the potential to delegitimise and weaken civil 
society. An important factor to account for the vulnerability of civil society and social movements is 
the absence of a politics of sustained mass participatory organising.
110 Mary Galvin (forthcoming, 2010), “Survival or Advocacy in Rural South Africa?” in Maharaj, Desai, and Bond (eds), Zuma’s 
Own Goal: Losing South Africa’s ‘War on Poverty’.
111 Du Toit (2004).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
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What determines the social mobilisation of, and active public participation by the poor? What can 
be learnt from the example of social movements, which despite other problems, seem to have been 
able to move significant strata of poor people into engaged agents for social change?
Contrary to this political marginality, Desai argues that we have also seen the ‘galvanisation’ of 
the poor who ‘have opposed water and electricity cut-offs and evictions (consequences of the 
privatisation of public services), and have begun making connections’. A variety of social movements 
arose in response to these consequences of state policy as well as the conditions of poverty and 
marginality. These social movements have focused on the immediacy and locality of their issues. 
These social movements can be thought of as embryonic elements of the ‘counter-movement 
demanding protection’. The demands and actions of the social movements have been classified as 
‘direct action’ focused on the state. Desai also recognises that many of these social movements have 
structural weaknesses when they have not been able to achieve tangible outcomes in the process 
of struggle.115
According to von Holdt and Webster, the significance of these social movements is their potential to 
re-socialise the crisis of social reproduction which is privatised into private crisis, distress and conflict 
in households and communities. They can do this by ‘building social solidarity around it, projecting 
it into the public arena, mobilising support and action, and influencing the state and public policy’.116 
Desai is more dramatic: ‘these movements have created a political scandal by deliberately engaging 
in actions that create instability and disorder’. He also imposes a massive historical task on these 
movements: according to him they ‘have come to constitute the most relevant post-1994 social force 
from the point of view of challenging the prevailing political economy’. Indeed, the poor people’s 
movements ‘are challenging the very distribution of power in society’ and are ‘a source of tremendous 
potential counter-power, if not counter-politics’. Related to the rise of social movements, Desai also 
identifies the onset of ‘quiet encroachment’ by ordinary people onto those who are propertied 
and powerful as a means to ensure survival. This may take the form of land occupation, stock theft, 
etc.117
Despite the rise of social movements and the prominent civil 
society organisations, ultimately, the above situation 
confirms weak popular forces that are capable 
of acting outside the state, the market and the 
family. 
In the South African reality that is so dominated by the ANC, we also need an understanding of 
its political contestations that are largely about ‘grievance’ and ‘conspiracy’ politics combined with 
masked calls for the inclusion of an elite group in decision-making. This kind of dramatic politics 
inevitably spirals up to schemes, plots, counter-conspiracies, hype, sensation and doing everything 
to deliver the next blow against the other side. In this drama, the ‘walking wounded’ doubled up as 
115 Desai (2003).
116 von Holdt and Webster (2005).
117 Desai (2003).
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‘emotive forces’ (and not motive forces) and aligned in the now infamous ‘coalition of the wounded’: 
the bloc that dislodged Thabo Mbeki from state power. 
All this potentially leads to the systemic political demobilisation of popular forces, the forsaking of 
democratic values and the undermining democratic impulses in broader society. In this scheme, 
politics becomes a kind of theatre in which the majority of the people are reduced to disempowered 
spectators whilst some of them are drawn into vocal players on the stage. The majority do not have 
much of a choice: they cannot choose not to watch the show, they have a choice when to applaud, 
failing which they can fall asleep or, at worst, grumble in muted protest. In such a plot, we see the 
death of a progressive democratic politics. Such politics have a debilitating effect on the extent to 
which popular forces can boldly and confidently struggle for the deepening of democracy.
Many strata amongst the popular forces have not completed the transition from being ‘subjects’ 
into being ‘citizens’. Instead, many have become ‘objects’ and passive (dissatisfied) recipients of 
development. More fundamentally, the state of being poor undermines the ability of poor people to 
participate fully in their own lives: poverty and the lack of power of poor households mutually reinforce 
each other. Whilst poverty may not rob the popular forces of their agency, however, it ‘circumscribes 
and limits the forms of agency that are available to them’. This political disempowerment weakens 
popular capacity to challenge the very social, economic and political processes which marginalise 
them. Instead, poor people are further integrated into the circuits and networks that marginalise 
them thus undermining their ability to control and impact upon the systems into which they are 
locked. 
Despite South Africa’s celebrated constitutional framework, we have to ask what are the structural 
limitations on accessing constitutional rights? These are identified and discussed below as structural 
inequality, the lack of a comprehensive social security system and the limited nature of a democratic 
system. Discussing these is to also suggest that the key (potential) drivers for change in South Africa 
derive from effective strategies that can overcome the given structural limitations. Absent in South 
Africa’s ‘miracle’ is wider economic transformation that brings significant material changes in the 
lives of a large sections of society. Instead the overall trend of human development and inequality 
indicators has pointed to growing misery and inequality. This shows how many of the positive human 
rights and constitutional changes will ultimately be hemmed in by the systemic and structural 
features of our socio-economic system. 
What are the real systemic and structural limits to human rights even though South Africa has an 
impressive human rights infrastructure is in place? 
Structural and systemic foundations of 
inequality remain intact even in conditions of restored 
profitability. 
Civil society in SA has only rarely focused on challenging the systemic and structural foundations 
of inequality. This perspective and voice are sorely needed. The unemployment problem in South 
Africa is systemically rooted in apartheid under-development, but it may also be related to the global 
restructuring of production and the increasing global inability of capitalism to absorb working-age 
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people into formal employment. To what extent can the strengthening of civil society also concern 
itself with debates and activities that seek to address the systemic and structural foundations? 
Current economic policy debates in the ruling ANC are important here. In these debates, there is a 
clear shift away from private sector led growth towards the notion of a developmental state. This is 
important. It is less certain whether such a move will necessarily address structural inequality and 
unemployment particularly given the silence on the role that ordinary people must play in economic 
transformation. Also absent in the public debate on economic policy are well-researched and well-
informed voices of civil society. Are there spaces to build the voice of civil society in economic policy 
debates and actual implementation? Access to rights and services hinges on the extent to which 
there is sustained economic growth, development and transformation. 
One other key absence in the human rights infrastructure is pluralities of democratic social power 
of the people: many sites of power where ordinary people recognise their social power, build their 
social weight, have effective multiple social voices and impact on all aspects of their lives. What is 
civil society doing to optimise and deepen democracy through building the social power, voice and 
weight of the constituencies that they work with? How to overcome the fragmentation of social 
movements and bring together broader coalitions for social justice? How should social movements 
engage with formal political structures and formations? How do we grow a new generation of 
activists? 
Also, what degree of engagement with a broadly neoliberal state is appropriate? The detail of the 
case studies undertaken reveal that while some organisations have built a partnership with the 
government, as in the Gift of the Givers (GoG), churches and NGOs in various communities, other 
organisations have been described as part of uncivil society given their potential to challenge 
fundamental economic policies of the government, as well as the militancy that they display, 
using even illegal means such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee’s (SECC) reconnection of 
electricity and the Anti-Privatisation’s advocacy of the removal of water meters in places like Phiri. 
Furthermore, the cases of Coalition Against Xenophobia (CAX) and the APF, as opposed to many 
NGO and faith-community responses, point to the difference between structural analysis and more 
immediate relief. On the one hand, the reactive responses by NGOs such as the Gift of the Givers have 
been necessary to mitigate the grief and suffering caused by the xenophobic violence in May 2008. 
On the other, COSATU, CAX and the SECC have attempted to deal with the issue of xenophobia in a 
more systemic and long-term manner, but these responses have varied across time and space.
Applying the above implications to the local context, civil society has to go beyond the limits of 
assimilation by the state, its constrained ‘service delivery’ frameworks, rights-based approaches 
and local power dynamics. Since the national policy framework has significantly institutionalized 
neoliberalism in the governance of localities, ‘community struggles in the local terrain cannot be 
isolated from or successfully prosecuted without linkages with struggles against neoliberalism at a 
national level’.118 In the local scale there are possibilities to break some new ground. 
118 Kgara (2007), Op cit.
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Critical here is the need for civil society to understand 
the spatial economic dimensions of neo-
apartheid cities, and therefore seek to build a political 
approaches that challenges this. 
Critical here is the development of a localised approach to sustained mass participatory organising 
which would go beyond clientelism, rights-based approaches and assimilation by the state. But this 
is not possible if civil society is not self-critical and is not based amongst those who are on the 
peripheral social, economic and political zones.
